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INTRODUCTION 
he road to hell is said to be paved with good intentions, and while 
there is no reason to question the intentions of international inves-
tors, there is good reason to question the activities of the international 
firms they invest in, as these firms have a significant impact on the states 
and communities in which they operate. While the impact of internation-
al investor firms can be beneficial—such corporations do, for instance, 
contribute to social and economic development—international businesses 
can also conduct their activities with detrimental disregard for the envi-
ronment and human rights. Indeed, the idea that global businesses harm 
local populations around the world is far from fiction. Even if extreme or 
systematic violations of “fundamental” human rights are not the rule, 
“minor,” everyday infractions are frequent and multitudinous. Private 
economic actors have an influential international role and in fact, some 
of their actions—had they been state actions instead—would potentially 
amount to wrongful international conduct. 
The answers provided by international law to this relatively new reality 
are far from sufficient. The investor is recognized as a passive subject of 
international law whose rights are guaranteed by interstate bilateral in-
vestment treaties (“BIT”), preferential trade agreements, and other re-
gional and multilateral instruments.1 At the same time, states recognize 
the international investor as an “equal,” active subject, with whom they 
sign “state investment contracts” that create reciprocal obligations for 
both parties. The objectives of these investment contracts are clear—the 
investor pursues profit and the host state pursues economic develop-
ment.2 It is true that the so-called globalization phenomenon arrived in 
the spirit of liberalization to facilitate and expand international invest-
ment practices; however, the normative landscape has remained largely 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. See David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 767–773 (2000) (discussing the rise of a network of bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral agreements pursued by states to protect private investors’ rights 
abroad). 
 2. The Preamble to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States begins: “Considering the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein.” Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, pmbl., 
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention]; see also Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 
41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) (in regards to the right to development 
as a human right, Article 1 states that “every human person and all peoples are entitled to 
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political develop-
ment, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”). 
T
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intersubjective, highly fragmented, and underinstitutionalized. A com-
plete set of general international norms is lacking and the various arbitral 
tribunals3 that continue to operate without centralized, organic, and sys-
temic links are forced to vacillate between the private will of the particu-
lar contracting parties and general international law.4 In other words, al-
though the investor is often elevated to the level of an international sub-
ject with the above-mentioned capacities, the international legal order 
remains silent as to the general obligations of that investor—particularly 
with respect to the universal values that make up the international public 
order. 
Given this asymmetry, this Article will examine the question of wheth-
er there is room for classic state responsibility to be applied when inves-
tors violate international human rights norms in the course of their activi-
ties within their host states. The circle of subjects that could be—
according to various legal bases—held accountable, however, extends 
beyond mere investors. International investment is a game of at least 
three players—the host state, the investor, and the investor’s home state.5 
                                                                                                                                     
 3. Although a large portion of arbitral tribunals are instituted within the framework 
of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), there are 
many others instituted ad hoc (mostly following the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules). 
 4. See Charles Leben, La théorie du contrat de’état et l’évolution du droit 
international des investissement, 302 RECUEIL DES COURS 197, 220 (2003); see 
also ICSID Convention, supra note 2, at art. 42(1). The ICSID Convention provides: 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may 
be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall 
apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules 
on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applica-
ble.  
Id. Concerning the applicability of the human rights international norms, see 
Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and Interna-
tional Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY., ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH 
SCHREUER 678, 678–707 (Christina Binder et. al., eds., 2009) (discussing how, by 
the means of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, investment tribunal may introduce human rights into judicial reasoning). 
 5. Two other “players” are also involved in this “game”: individuals (members of 
the local population which is directly affected by the consequences of the behavior of the 
three main “players”) and the international community as a whole (which can be indi-
rectly affected when the behavior of the three main “players” amounts to a violation of 
erga omnes norms of international law). See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human 
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 508 (2001) (describing the 
relationship between the investor corporations and affected individuals as “ties . . . falling 
within concentric circles emanating from the enterprise, with spheres enlarging from 
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With respect to international law, the responsibility of the host state in 
which the violation occurs is self-evident.6 In similar terms, as far as the 
home state is concerned, while exercising its territorial jurisdiction, it is 
expected to regulate and control investment activities in a way that will 
effectively guarantee respect for all universally recognized human rights. 
However, the international responsibility of the second player—the in-
vestor—is in status nascendi, or, underdeveloped. This very gap (or, la-
cuna) calls for the exploration of alternative legal pathways. According-
ly, the object of this Article is to focus on classic state responsibility as 
the basis for the argument that, next to the host state, the home state may 
also be held internationally responsible for the conduct of an investor 
violating internationally protected human rights.7 
To validate this argument in terms of positive law, this Article propos-
es a legal framework de lege ferenda (i.e., legal framework of “what the 
law ought to be”) and outlines its limitations and conditions of applica-
tion. The idea is simple. In terms of international law, for a state to be 
deemed internationally responsible, it must have breached, by act or 
                                                                                                                                     
employees to their families, to the citizens of a given locality otherwise affected by their 
operation (admittedly a broad and amorphous category), and eventually to an entire coun-
try.”). Special attention should also be paid to the role of international organizations, 
particularly to the role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, whose 
impact in promoting (mainly through conditionality) international standards is quite often 
bigger than that of the states. See, e.g., Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Non-State Actors and Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
ACTION 109, 118–33 (Mashood A. Baderin & Robert McCrosuodale eds., 2007). 
 6. See Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 351–52 (stating that “from the 
standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primari-
ly territorial” and “as a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights 
of the other relevant States”). 
 7. Only few scholars have so far written in support of this argument. See Francesco 
Francioni, Exporting Environmental Hazard through Multinational Enterprises: Can the 
State of Origin be Held Responsible?, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 275 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991) (arguing 
that the home state may be held responsible for the activities of the investor for pollution 
of the environment); Francesco Francioni, Alternative Perspectives on International Re-
sponsibility for Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations, in ECONOMIC 
GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 245 (Wolfgang Benedek, Koen de Feyter & Fabrizio 
Marrella eds., 2007) (arguing that the home state may be held responsible for the activi-
ties of the investor for violations of human rights); Robert McCorquodale, Spreading 
Weeds Beyond Their Garden: Extraterritorial Responsibility of States for Violations of 
Human Rights by Corporate Nationals, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 95 (2006); Robert 
McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility 
for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 
MOD. L. REV. 598, 600–01, 615–623 (2007). Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in 
a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 305–307 (2002). 
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omission, one of its international obligations. Accordingly, to hold the 
home state responsible for conduct of its own investors acting outside its 
territory—i.e., conduct in principle not attributable to it—the home state 
must be bound by an autonomous international obligation, the breach of 
which is deemed an internationally wrongful act. Part I of this Article 
will clarify and delimit certain aspects of this discussion and the bases of 
its significance. In Part II, this Article introduces the generic internation-
al obligation of due diligence, which requires that every state should, to 
the best of its respective ability, fight breaches of international law by 
implementing deterrent or retributive punishment measures. Part II will 
also examine more closely the scope of the due diligence obligation and 
its effect with regard to international human rights, highlighting its bene-
fits as well as necessary limits on its imposition. Part III will then link 
the due diligence obligation to the home state’s duty to deter investors 
from, or punish investors for, committing human rights violations outside 
its territory, implying that a state’s failure to do so implicates interna-
tional liability on the part of that state. To facilitate this framework, two 
types of jurisdictional basis are proposed: universal jurisdiction and ac-
tive personality. While the first basis falls under the absolute discretion 
of state authorities, the latter, if seen from the perspective of extraterrito-
riality, turns into an international obligation for the state of origin. 
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
A. The Asymmetries of Public International Law and the Need for Surro-
gate Solutions 
Since the “mainstream” solutions provided by public international law 
have been inadequate thus far, the “surrogate” solutions proposed in this 
article are promising, if not necessary, in the face of ongoing investor 
human rights violations. The scenario is well-understood. While interna-
tional investors callously perpetrate violations, they remain immune to 
retribution from their host states because the governmental bodies of 
those states are either corrupt or blinded by the economic growth the 
corporations stand to stimulate.8 This picture of inefficiency is replete 
                                                                                                                                     
 8. See, e.g., Chimugwuanya Nwobike & Richard Aduche Wokocha, Privileging 
Investor Rights over Public Interest in Investment Agreements - The Human Rights Impli-
cations of the Chad/Cameroon Conventions of Establishment, 10 RECHT IN AFRIKA 95 
(2007) (Ger.) (detailing the contracts of establishment signed between Chad and Came-
roon on one side, and a consortium of oil companies on the other which contained bur-
densome clauses that were voluntarily endorsed by local governments and might in fact 
undermine those governments’ ability to guarantee the respect of human rights); see also 
Kenneth F. McCallion, Institutional and Procedural Aspect of Mass Claims Litigation 
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given the absence of a mature and effective legal body for holding the 
investor directly accountable at the international level. Thus, the situation 
calls for more imaginative ideas. 
The international legal order has always been imperfect. The transition 
from jus gentium to the Vatelian model of jus inter gentes deprived the 
individual of legal consideration at the international level for quite some 
time. It was only after the Second World War that the need to move to-
ward a “modern” international legal regime emerged.9 And it was then 
that universal human rights norms emerged and established the “individ-
ual” as a passive subject who holds rights and owes duties that emanate 
directly from the international legal order.10 
However, modernity did not disown each and every characteristic of 
“classicism” within international law. With modernity, the focus re-
mained on states; sovereign domestic governments continued to assert 
exclusive competence and authority to determine the extent of the inter-
national legal capacity of the other international subjects, including pri-
vate entities.11 The attributes of that legal capacity with respect to natural 
persons (e.g., citizens, minority citizens, terrorists, rebels or members of 
a liberation group) as well as legal persons (e.g., non-governmental or-
ganizations, multinational corporations, or trade unions) varied according 
to sovereign state’s will.12 At the international level, the private actor was 
only assigned legal rights or duties to the extent that states consented.13 
This is the “voluntarist” narrative of international law.14 
The “objectivist” perspective, on the other hand, marginalizes the role 
of states in determining the legal rights and duties of private actors by 
                                                                                                                                     
and Settlement: The Exxon Valdez and Bhopal Gas Disaster Cases, in INSTITUTIONAL 
AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF MASS CLAIMS SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS: PAPERS EMANATING 
FROM THE PCA INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR ON DECEMBER 9, 1999, at 43, 52–57 (The 
International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2000) (detailing the fail-
ure of the judiciary of India to provide effective judicial protection in the case of the 
thousands of victims of the Bophal accident); Erik J. Woodhouse, Note, The “Guerra Del 
Agua” and the Cochabamba Concession: Social Risk and Foreign Direct Investment in 
Public Infrastructure, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003). 
 9. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE PERPLEXITIES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15–16 
(2004). 
 10. See, e.g., JOE VERHOEVEN, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 295–312 (2000). 
 11. See ROSENNE, supra note 9, at 15–16. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 15–17. 
 14. Emmanuelle Juannet, A Century of French International Law Scholarship, 61 ME. 
L. REV. 83, 94 (2009). “The positivism of this period generally expresses a fairly simple, 
voluntarist conception of law: international law is a product of state consent, which is the 
foundation of the law it produces.” Id. 
162 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
placing emphasis on international social necessity.15 The International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has outlined in case law a system of “variable 
geometry” stressing that the nature of international legal personality de-
pends upon the collective needs of the international community.16 Still, 
despite the emergence of the objectivist perspective, there remains a glar-
ing asymmetry. The lacunae of the international system are the result of 
its very nature and its transition towards a multilayered society.17 Thus, 
while the individual investor is a “giant” international actor, the legal 
obligations and responsibilities attributed to him or her are those of a 
“pygmy.” Indeed, when it comes to individual actors, international law 
only provides for hybrid criminalization of certain serious transgressions. 
Of course, it is true that the problem of investor human rights viola-
tions is relatively new; the private economic actor was never as rambunc-
tious in the past. But efforts at the international level to prevent corpora-
tions from abusing human rights did not begin with globalization as they 
date back to the 1970s and the New International Economic Order 
(“NIEO”).18 In June 1976, the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(“Guidelines”) were drafted as part of the broader “policy commitment” 
of the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises, which was adopted within the framework of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).19 After numerous 
                                                                                                                                     
 15. Id. at 94–95 (characterizing social objectivism as “translating what [is] necessary 
for social solidarity”). 
 16. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11) “The subjects of law in any legal system are not 
necessarily identical in their nature of in the extent of their rights, and their nature de-
pends upon the needs of the community.” Id. 
 17. The fact that corporations are accredited more prerogatives than duties is not 
simply the result of the unwillingness or feebleness of the international community of 
states to set a complete general normative corpus for their obligations and the consequent 
responsibility in the case of violation. This lacunae in fact reflects a broader asymmetry 
in the development of general international law and can, equally, find explanation in the 
fact that the international realities generating the necessity to develop a broader interna-
tional legal frame for the activities of the private factor are relatively new. 
 18. For an overview of the initiatives undertaken at the international level until re-
cently, see ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS ON NON-STATE ACTORS 
201, 201–531 (2006); Josep M. Lozana & Maria Prandi, Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Human Rights, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 183 (Ramon Mullerat ed., 2005); Olivier De Schut-
ter, The Challenge of Imposing Human Rights Norms on Corporate Actors, in 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 2–22 (Olivier De Schutter ed., 
2006). 
 19. See Donald J. Johnson, Promoting Corporate Responsibility: The OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST  CENTURY 243, 247 (Ramon Mullerat ed., 2005). 
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revisions, leading up to the most recent version in 2000, these Guidelines 
remain in force.20 The provisions are in the form of recommendations by 
governments addressed to corporations operating in, or originating from, 
participating states, including members of the OECD as well as a very 
small number of non-member governments. The Guidelines contain non-
binding principles and standards of good practices for responsible corpo-
rate behavior, which are complementary to the pre-existing legislation.21 
As far as human rights are concerned under the Guidelines, corporations 
are expected to respect the human rights of the people affected by their 
activities consistent with the host government’s international obliga-
tions.22 Although supervision remains voluntary and is characterized by 
the absence of sanctioning mechanisms, the effectiveness of the Guide-
lines is controlled by the network of National Contact Points,23 which 
operate at a domestic level and cooperate with the Investment Commit-
tee.24 
The International Labour Organization’s (“ILO”) Tripartite Declara-
tion of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Poli-
cy (the “Declaration”) was added in 1977 to the list of the nonbinding 
                                                                                                                                     
 20. For the current version of the Guidelines, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2001), available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428. pdf [hereinafter “OECD Guidelines”]. 
 21. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, Preface. 
 22. OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, Part II (suggesting that enterprises should 
“[r]espect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host 
government’s international obligations and commitments.”); see also ANDREW CLAPHAM, 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 204–205 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Final Statement by the U.K. National Contact Point for the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Afrimex (U.K.) Ltd., (Aug. 28, 2008), available 
at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file47555.doc. Global Witness accused Afrimex U.K. 
Ltd., inter alios, for having paid taxes to rebel forces in the Democratic Republic of Con-
go and for having practiced inadequate due diligence on the supply chain, by purchasing 
minerals from mines that used child and forced labor. Id. ¶ 6. The National Contact Point 
concluded that, although the accused corporation did not pay taxes to the rebel groups, its 
associated companies did so, with Afrimex failing to influence its associates. Id. ¶ 26–27, 
39. With regard to the second main allegation, it was held that Afrimex in fact applied 
failed to exercise due diligence on the supply chain. Id. ¶ 51–62. However, since the Na-
tional Contact Points lack authority to impose sanctions or order reparation for the vi-
olated rights of the victims, and their decisions are deprived of any binding effect, the 
statement in the Afrimex case limits its scope in a number of recommendations to the 
respondent company. Id. ¶ 63–77. 
 24. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES OF THE 
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2001), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. The Investment Committee is the 
OECD body responsible for providing clarification over the scope of the Guidelines and 
for overseeing their application. Id. 
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international documents calling for corporations to respect human 
rights.25 Apart from referring to those rights afforded strictly under the 
ILO, such as the fundamental rights of workers, the Declaration contains 
a provision making specific reference to the ILO conventions, as well as 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UNDHR”) 
and the Covenants.26 Despite the soft law nature of the Declaration and 
the absence of any sanctioning mechanisms, member states are expected 
to report to the ILO’s Governing Body on its implementation. The ILO 
Governing Body has the power to make recommendations to member 
states’ governments and interpret—under a specific procedure for the 
examination of disputes—the provisions of the Declaration. 
The third step toward the progressive development of investor’s inter-
national human rights obligations coincided with the well-known United 
Nations Global Compact.27 Among the principles announced by the 
United Nations Secretary General in 2000, the first two refer to the sup-
port and respect that corporations should demonstrate in the field of in-
ternationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence, 
and to the obligation to avoid acts of complicity in human right abuses.28 
The next four principles are devoted to labor rights—namely, the free-
dom of association, the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of 
forced and compulsory labor, the abolition of child labor, and the prohi-
bition of employment discrimination.29 Following the “trend,” the Global 
Compact presents itself as a nonregulatory “instrument” that does not 
provide for legal enforcement of its provisions. Instead, the Global Com-
pact merely provides a framework for corporations to endorse voluntari-
ly. At the same time, the Global Compact serves as a consensus-based 
political forum that involves, in the process of effecting values incorpo-
                                                                                                                                     
 25. INT’L LABOR ORG., TRIPARTE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (2006), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/declaration2006.pdf. The 
most recent version of the Declaration was adopted in March 2006. Id. 
 26. See UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. RES. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/ 
en/documents/udhr/ [hereinafter “UNDHR”]. The Covenants referred to are the two main 
UN Covenants on human rights—Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Cove-
nant on Social and Economic Rights. 
 27. For further information, see UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL Compact, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited on Nov. 12, 2009). 
 28. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL Compact, THE TEN PRINCIPLES, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2009). 
 29. Id. 
2010] INVESTORS’ HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 165 
rated in its ten principles, all the relevant social actors such as states, in-
ternational organizations, and international private actors.30 
Finally, at the forefront of previous efforts to prevent corporate abuses 
of human rights is the 2003 United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibili-
ties of Transnational Corporations and other Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights (the “UN Norms”), recommended by the United Nations’ 
Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
the Protection of Human Rights.31 Contrary to the first three endeavors, 
the UN Norms were intended as “normative” in the prescriptive sense. 
Nevertheless, their current legal standing remains unsurprisingly limited 
to soft law. To the extent that the UN Norms do not restate preexisting 
law, they identify the need for further normative prescription in the 
field.32 They also have, as all soft law documents, an indisputably per-
missive effect,33 serving as a basis for further regulation. Since the 
preamble of the UN Norms refers to UN treaties and other international 
instruments that set human rights standards, the proposed UN Norms are 
meant to be read in light of the existing international standards. While 
states bear the primary responsibility for ensuring the respect of interna-
tional human rights standards, corporations also are expected to “pro-
mote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect 
human rights” within their sphere of influence.34 Although the UN 
Norms include provisions regarding implementation, monitoring (by the 
UN), and forms of reparation, the absence of clear-cut normativity steri-
lizes the UN Norms and diminishes the likelihood that the “instrument” 
could be made effective via domestic or international judicial interpreta-
tion. Consequently, a number of questions regarding the nature and ex-
                                                                                                                                     
 30. Among others, the private actors include global civil society, the labor force, and 
of course, businesses. 
 31. U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot. 
of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26 2003) [hereinafter “UN 
Norms”]. Concerning the drafting history of the UN Norms, see David Kinley & Rachel 
Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of 
Public International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 456–459 (2006). 
 32. Nils Roseman, Business Human Rights Obligations – The “Norms of Responsibil-
ity of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights”, 23 NORDIC J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 47, 48–60 (2005). 
 33. This is the case for both multinational corporations and states. Also, while multi-
national corporations may “self-restrict” their conduct so that it meets the standards of the 
UN Norms, national governments also have the power to impose these norms on the cor-
porations through domestic legislation. 
 34. UN Norms, supra note 31, ¶ 1. 
166 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
tent of investor obligations remain unanswered. For instance, while the 
obligations of the private actors are mainly limited in the status negati-
vus35 dimension of human rights, the question of affirmative obligations 
remains unclear.36 
Customary international human rights are erga omnes in that they are 
applicable against the entire world; thus, they are implicitly objective. 
Indeed, it is uncontroversial that certain universal values bind each and 
every subject of the international legal order, including nonstate actors.37 
Still, while it may be self-evident that investors are required to respect 
human rights, international law lacks a mature normative framework re-
gulating ad hoc the human rights duties of corporations. Furthermore, no 
direct international legal enforcement mechanism exists for the human 
right obligations of the investor. In the absence of explicitly enforceable 
norms, efforts to sanction investors for transgressions fall flat. At 
present, the only tangible development with respect to investors is the 
self-restrictive ideal of “social accountability,” which leaves much to be 
desired.38 
The blame for these shortcomings, however, should not be placed sole-
ly on states or international governmental bodies or institutions. General 
international law has always been a product of custom, reflecting prac-
tical social necessity that was often validated by a judge with the authori-
                                                                                                                                     
 35. Jakob Ragnwaldh & Paolo Konopik, The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 
21ST CENTURY 251, 254 (Ramon Mullerat ed., 2005). 
 36. It has been suggested that corporations have a positive duty to protect human 
rights in cases of certain categories or groups of individuals, such as their own workers or 
people residing on land owned by the corporation. See The Danish Institute for Human 
Rights, The Human Rights and Business Project, DEFINING THE SCOPE OF BUSINESS 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABROAD, at 8-9, available at 
http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/files/320569722/file/defining_the_scope_of_busine
ss_responsibiliy_.pdf (last visit Dec. 20, 2009). 
 37. For example, the Institute of International Law suggested that “certain obligations 
bind all subjects of international law for the purposes of maintaining the fundamental 
values of the international community.” Institut de droit international, Resolution: Obli-
gations Erga Omnes in International Law (Aug. 27, 2005); see also UNDHR, supra note 
26, Article 1 (providing: “All human beings . . . should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood.”); UNDHR, supra note 26, art. 30 (providing: “Nothing in this Declara-
tion may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in 
any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and free-
doms set forth herein.”). 
 38. Corporate Social Responsibility is a set of discretionary corporate policies aimed 
at responding to social expectations. However, they lack legal enforceability. Cf., e.g., 
Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsi-
bility, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATIONS 335, 335–365 (David Kinley ed., 2009). 
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ty of which he or she disposed. In short, the process is ongoing—as long 
as global investments continue to raise complicated legal and moral is-
sues, one should expect that the gaps discovered in the existing interna-
tional legal framework will inevitably be filled. 
Until the gaps discussed herein are filled, it is likewise inevitable that 
legal scholars and the practice itself will search for “substitute” solutions. 
However, these alternative legal frameworks can only be based on posi-
tive international law and its “realities,” among which the most profound 
is that of a legal order suffering from the “not-a-cat” syndrome.39 The 
mere fact that private economic actors are referred to as “nonstate” illu-
strates the extreme extent to which the international legal system is state-
centric. The law of the international community lato sensu remains in 
essence the result of the international community stricto sensu, which is 
the international community of states.40 Accordingly, the duty to exercise 
control over corporations rests primarily with the state. While this may 
sound obvious when it comes to a host state exercising jurisdiction over 
investors’ actions or omissions occurring in or affecting that state, it 
ought to be an equally well-received principle even when a state lacks 
such a straightforward interest in the matter—for instance, when the state 
is home to the investor.41 Since states cannot assert territorial jurisdiction 
over resident investors for conduct taking place abroad, another jurisdic-
tional basis is necessary if investors are to be policed by their home 
states for human rights transgressions. 
                                                                                                                                     
 39. Philip Alston, The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights 
Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 
3–36 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). Alston criticizes the use of negatively defined terms, such 
as “non-state actors,” as well as the state-centric reading of international law by the 
means of comparison with the linguistic skills of his daughter at the age of eighteen 
months, when she was calling all animals as “not-a-cat.” 
 40. See, e.g., RENÉ JEAN DUPUY, LA COMMUNAUTÉ INTERNATIONALE ENTRE LE MYTHE 
ET L’HISTOIRE (1986); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, La communauté internationale: une fiction?, 
in JEAN J. A. SALMON, DROIT DU POUVOIR, POUVOIR DU DROIT: MÉLANGES OFFERTS À JEAN 
SALMON 373, 373–376 (2007); Robert Kolb, Quelques réflexions sur la “communauté 
international,” 10 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 431 (2002); Johannes van Aggelen, Implementation 
of Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Reality Check, 20 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 31 (2008). 
 41. As it will be explained below, the idea here concerns the exercise of parallel ju-
risdiction by the home state when the host state cannot or does not want to exercise its 
own jurisdiction for regulating and controlling the activities of the investor that threaten 
the enjoyment of human rights by the local population. See infra Part III. 
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B. Presumptions and Simplifications: The Gordian Knot of Nationality 
To qualify as a “home state” or “state of origin,” the state must have a 
particular association with the investing firm that is developing its activi-
ties abroad. General international law provides a number of practice-
based criteria for determining the nationality of a legal person. In gener-
al, states enjoy absolute discretion to unilaterally establish conditions for 
granting nationality. If these conditions are met, they are given full effect 
within the domestic order of the state which granted its nationality to a 
subject (for instance, access to justice). However, the international oppo-
sability of nationality vis-à-vis the other states remains a controversial 
issue, mainly depending on the criterion of the effectiveness in the bonds 
between an individual person and the state which granted its nationality 
to that person.42 With respect to corporations, as the ICJ suggested with 
its famous dictum in the Barcelona Traction case, the two potential bases 
for determining nationality are the place of incorporation and the location 
of the corporation’s administrative seat (the so-called effective seat or 
siège social).43 The piercing of the corporate veil in order to investigate 
the nationality of the shareholders is not viable.44 Accordingly, for the 
                                                                                                                                     
 42. For example, see the Nottebohm case before the ICJ. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. 
Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6). There, the Court refused to allow Liechtenstein to exercise 
diplomatic protection in favor of a formerly German citizen, which has only acquired its 
nationality during the war. The Court based its decision on the criterion of the effective-
ness in the bonds between the state and its nationals. The nonopposability of the national-
ity conferred to Nottebohm at the international relations of Liechtenstein with Guatemala 
had no impact at all to the rights and obligations of Nottebohm within Liechtenstein’s 
domestic legal order. 
 43. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 
3, 42 (Feb. 5); see also Article 9 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection which provides:  
For the purposes of the diplomatic protection of a corporation, the State of na-
tionality means the State under whose law the corporation was incorporated. 
However, when the corporation is controlled by nationals of another State or 
States and has no substantial business activities in the State of incorporation, 
and the seat of management and the financial control of the corporation are 
both located in another State, that State shall be regarded as the State of natio-
nality. 
United Nations International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 
available at  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006. 
pdf. But cf. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20) 
(where the Court, in order to determine the nationality of the corporation, proceeded with 
the foreign control test. However, this was what the two parties had expressly agreed in a 
prior treaty). 
 44. According to Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, a “national of another 
Contracting State” is  
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purposes of this Article, a corporation acting abroad can be presumed to 
be either incorporated in its state of origin (transnational corporations), 
or linked with its state of origin by an alternative, informal, but effective 
link—namely, the location of its headquarters. 
Since corporate law is not one of the fields of expertise of international 
lawyers, this Article will simplify discussions of multinational corporate 
structure as if limited to one parent company located in state X and sev-
eral subsidiaries conducting business in countries A, B, and C. The seat 
of the parent company—effective or not—is deemed the home state. Al-
though the subsidiary corporation might be incorporated in the host state, 
and may, as such, be an independent legal person within the latter’s legal 
order, the parent company will be presumed to exercise decisive control 
over subsidiary policy-making and consequent practice.45 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                     
any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the 
State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such 
dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality 
of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign 
control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting 
State for the purposes of this Convention. 
ICSID Convention, ¶ 25(2)(b). As Christoph H. Schreuer suggests in his commentary on the 
ICSID Convention, since the second clause of Article 25(2)(b) provides expressly that the test of 
foreign control shall be applied in the case that the corporation has the nationality of the host state, 
the logic of systematic interpretation calls for accepting that in all other cases the foreign control 
test should be excluded. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 
278 (2001). The case law of ICSID tribunals supports Schreuer’s analysis. Id. at 278–281 (provid-
ing the relevant ICSID case law and a list of the authors supporting this point of view). 
 45. In line with the language of the second clause of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Conven-
tion, jurisdiction of the tribunals established under ICSID rules is extended to companies which, 
because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as nationals of another con-
tracting party rather than the respondent (host) state. Foreign control constitutes the objective 
condition for both the applicability of this provision and the consequent extension of ICSID’s 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the contractual freedom of states parties to ICSID is conditioned by the 
respect of the criterion of the effective foreign control. In a recent ICSID award case, TSA Spec-
trum de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal, after referring in extenso to the rele-
vant international—and mainly ICSID—case law, suggested,  
the ratio legis of [the second clause of Article 25(2)(b)] exception is the word-
ing ‘because of foreign control.’ Foreign control is thus the objective factor on 
which turns the applicability of this provision. It justifies the extension of the 
ambit of ICSID, but sets the objective limits of the exception at the same time. . 
. . A significant difference between the two clauses of Article 25(2)(b) is that 
the first uses a formal legal criterion, that of nationality, whilst the second uses 
a material or objective criterion, that of ‘foreign control’ in order to pierce the 
corporate veil and reach for the reality behind the cover of nationality. Once the 
Parties have agreed to the use of the latter criterion for juridical persons having 
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the bridge between the state of origin and the firm incorporated in the 
host state, although lacking in formal terms, should correspond to the 
criterion of effectiveness of the parent’s company control of its subsidiar-
ies.46 It goes without saying that the degree of effectiveness is subject to 
proof on a case by case basis. 
C. Delimiting the Article’s Focus: Excluding “Direct” Attribution and 
Complicity 
Before moving on to this Article’s chief focus—the due diligence obli-
gation—the last point of logistics is to point out two legal bases which, 
although under certain conditions they may open the way to state respon-
sibility for human rights abuses by the investor, will not be among the 
primary considerations of this discussion: “direct” attribution and com-
plicity. 
Acts or omissions of private entities are generally not attributable to 
states.47 Accordingly, in principle, states are not internationally responsi-
                                                                                                                                     
the nationality of the host State, they are bound by this criterion as a condition 
for ICSID jurisdiction and cannot extend that jurisdiction by other agreements. 
TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID award (W. Bank) 
ARB/05/05 2008, ¶ 139-141. “The text itself allows the parties to agree to lift the corpo-
rate veil, but only ‘because of foreign control,’ which justifies, but at the same time con-
ditions, this exception.” Id. ¶147. The aim of the arbitrator should be the discovery of the 
real source of foreign control. 
 46. See Institut de Droit International, Obligations of Multinational Enterprises and 
their Member Co., at ¶ 2 (Sept. 1, 1995), available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1995_lis_04_en.PDF (last accessed Nov. 10, 2009); Andrew J. 
Wilson, Beyond Unocal: Conceptual Problems in Using International Norms to Hold 
Transnational Corporations Liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, in TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 47, 63 (Olivier De Schutter ed., 2006) (examin-
ing the question of whether parent companies have an obligation of vigilance under the 
theory of “piercing the corporate veil”). 
 47. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY – INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 91 (2002).  
In theory, the conduct of all human beings, corporations or collectivities linked 
to the State by nationality, habitual residence or incorporation might be attri-
buted to the State, whether or not they have any connection to the Government. 
In international law, such an approach is avoided, both with a view to limiting 
responsibility to conduct which engages the State as an organization, and also 
so as to recognize the autonomy of persons acting on their own account and not 
at the instigation of a public authority. Thus, the general rule is that the only 
conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that of its organs of 
government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or con-
trol of those organs, i.e., as agents of the State. 
Id. 
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ble for the wrongful conduct of their nationals. However, there are ex-
ceptions. Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Proposal 
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the 
“ILC Norms on State Responsibility”)48 provides that the conduct of a 
private individual can be considered an act of the state if the individual is 
in fact acting “on the instructions of, or under the direction or control, of 
that State” (de facto organ).49 Outside this case, wrongful acts of individ-
uals may be attributed to states in four other instances as well: (1) when 
any private entity (including a corporation)50 is empowered by a state to 
exercise elements of the state’s governmental authority (empowered enti-
ty);51 (2) when the state voluntarily endorses, or “acknowledges and 
adopts,” the illicit conduct of a private actor (adopted agent);52 (3) in the 
case of insurrectional movements which become the new government of 
the state;53 and (4) in the event of an “agency in necessity,”54—that is, a 
situation where individuals are “in fact exercising elements of a govern-
mental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and 
in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of the elements of au-
thority.”55 
Of the above-mentioned five legal bases, only the first three could po-
tentially allow for the attribution of investor human rights abuses to 
states, and only in highly unlikely scenarios. Thus, if direct attribution 
                                                                                                                                     
 48. U.N. INT’L LAW COMM’N [ILC], Draft Proposal on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter “ILC 
Norms on State Responsibility”]. 
 49. The interpretation of Article 8 concerning the nature or the level of control that a 
State shall exercise over the behavior of the individual so that this behavior is directly 
attributable to it has opened a “Pandora’s Box” towards the fragmentation of general 
international law. Compare Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 
(July 15, 1999), with Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
64–65 (June 27), and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Genocide case) (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of 
Feb. 26, 2007), ¶ 406–07, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1 
=3&p2=2 (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007). The International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in Tadic diverted from ICJ’s “effective control” test set forth in the 
Nicaragua judgment and introduced a less strict level of control, described as “overall.” 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 (July 15, 1999). In response, 
the ICJ, in the Genocide decision criticized ICTY’s proposed basis and insisted on its 
own Nicaragua test. Genocide Case, ¶ 406. 
 50. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 100. 
 51. Only governmental activities, and not commercial ones, of a corporation acting as 
an “empowered entity” may be attributed to states. Id. at 101. 
 52. Id. at 121–23. 
 53. See id. at 116–20. 
 54. Id. at 114. 
 55. Id. 
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were the only available basis, a large number of investor human rights 
violations would be left outside the scope of state international responsi-
bility. 
As far as the second legal basis that is excluded by the analysis of this 
Article is concerned, while states are often complicit in investor human 
rights abuses, the international legal framework regarding such complici-
ty appears to be rather elliptic and problematic. According to Article 16 
of the ILC Norms on State Responsibility, a state may be internationally 
responsible as complicit when it provides aid or assistance for an act that 
would be internationally wrongful if committed by the state itself, with 
knowledge of the circumstances of the act.56 The very fact that Article 16 
governs instances where a state is complicit in the acts of another state 
but fails to concern itself with instances in which a state is complicit in 
the acts of private entities serves as another perfect illustration of the 
asymmetrical development of general international law. However, this is 
just one side of the coin. 
The framework regulating corporate complicity, though in its infancy, 
goes well beyond that of state complicity. Leaving aside the regulation of 
state complicity in international crimes,57 it is important to return to the 
                                                                                                                                     
 56. See id. at 148. 
 57. Referring specifically to the issue of complicity in international crimes by multi-
national corporations, Andrew Clapham gives the example of the 2002 Unocal case be-
fore the domestic courts of United States on the basis of the Alien Tort Claims Act. And-
rew Clapham, State Responsibility, Corporate Responsibility, and Complicity in Human 
Rights Violations, in RESPONSIBILITY IN WORLD BUSINESS: MANAGING HARMFUL SIDE-
EFFECTS OF CORPORATE ACTIVITY 50, 60–65 (Lene Bomann-Larsen & Oddny Wiggen 
eds., 2004); see also infra Part III.A.1. The Unocal case concerned crimes, involving 
forced labor, committed by the army of Myanmar in favor of the defendant-corporation. 
One of the issues addressed in the case was the appropriateness of attributing those 
crimes to Unocal, in whose interest the army acted. Despite the fact that the claim con-
cerned a tort and not a crime, the American courts found it appropriate to refer to interna-
tional criminal law and concluded that, although under international criminal law the 
support provided by the individual shall have a substantial effect, complicity does not 
require full participation in the execution of an international crime. Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal 
dismissed per stipulation and judgment vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). In a recent 
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated a high stan-
dard for establishing that a corporation has aided and abetted a government in breaching 
human rights. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2009). Under this standard, mere knowledge of the human right breaches is in-
sufficient under the ATCA for establishing the responsibility of a corporation; instead, 
for a finding of corporate responsibility, intent to further the breaches must be shown. 
Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 259. (“Thus, applying international law, we hold that the 
mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in [ATCA] actions is purpose rather 
than knowledge alone. Even if there is a sufficient international consensus for imposing 
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UN Global Compact, which, from its own perspective, draws a broader 
picture. The comments to the Global Compact regarding the second prin-
ciple that prohibits complicity, introduce an artful typology of the con-
cept, classified as direct, beneficial, and silent.58 According to the com-
ments, corporations are not only expected to avoid behaviors that are 
directly complicit with state abuses of human rights, but also must not 
benefit from such abuses and must refrain from acts that might under-
mine state efforts to protect human rights.59 Although the UN Norms do 
not make explicit use of the term “complicity,” the attributes described 
are equally concrete. According to paragraph 3 of the UN Norms, corpo-
rations should not “engage in nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, torture, forced disappearance, forced or compulsory 
labor, hostage-taking, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
other violations of humanitarian law and other international crimes 
against the human person as defined by international law, in particular 
human rights and humanitarian law.”60 Similarly, paragraph 11 requires 
that corporations “refrain from any activity which supports, solicits, or 
encourages states or any other entities to abuse human rights,” and 
should “seek to ensure that the goods and services they provide will not 
be used to abuse human rights.”61 
The prima facie normative asymmetry between the concept of com-
plicity introduced by the ILC Norms on State Responsibility and the two 
above-mentioned documents is self-evident. However, one could argue 
that such a comparative approach lacks substance. While the UN Norms 
aim at setting primary substantive obligations, the ILC Norms on State 
Responsibility refers to secondary obligations, which become applicable 
                                                                                                                                     
liability on individuals who purposefully aid and abet a violation of international law … 
no such consensus exists for imposing liability on individuals who knowingly (but not 
purposefully) aid and abet a violation of international law.” (emphasis in the original) 
(internal citation omitted).). 
 58. United National Global Compact, The Ten Principles: Principle Two, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/Principle2.html (last 
visited August 3, 2009). 
 59. See Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Hu-
man Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 339–349 (2001). The anal-
ysis proposed by Clapham and Jerbi moves in the direction of confirming the existence of 
an obligation for corporations to adopt one certain positive measure against human rights 
violations. According to Clapham and Jerbi, in order for a corporation not to be accused 
of “silent complicity,” it is expected to “raise systematic or continuous human right 
abuses with the appropriate authorities.” Id. at 347–48. 
 60. UN Norms, supra note 31, ¶ 3. 
 61. UN Norms, supra note 31, ¶ 11. 
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only if a state violates a primary obligation.62 However, as has been 
noted by scholars, the way in which the ILC Norms on State Responsi-
bility treat complicity bears a strong resemblance to the identification of 
a primary norm.63 
To the extent that this argument is valid, it justifies the comparison of 
the two parallel normative frameworks. It is noted then that, despite the 
fact that the soft-law prohibition on private entity complicity in state hu-
man rights abuses is broader than the prohibition on state complicity, 
both states and investors have a substantive, core international obligation 
not to “aid or assist” each other in violating international human rights 
norms. Recognition of this implicit parallel is an important step toward 
remedying the abovementioned normative asymmetry. Its extension into 
practice could be achieved on the basis of Article 16 of the ILC Norms 
on State Responsibility. First, state complicity could, by the means of 
analogy of law, be extended so that it also covers complicity in private 
wrongful acts. Second, the criteria introduced by Article 16 can, also by 
analogy of law, serve as the basis for establishing the responsibility of 
corporations that aid or assist states in perpetrating human rights 
abuses.64 
However, even if analogy of law would prove an effective solution, 
another asymmetry would still substantially differentiate state complicity 
from investor complicity. While there is a full set of secondary interna-
tional obligations for states, private international responsibility remains 
                                                                                                                                     
 62. Crawford, supra note 47, at 77.  
Article 1 states the basic principle underlying the articles as a whole, which is 
that a breach of international law by a State entails its international responsibili-
ty. An internationally wrongful act of a State may consist in one or more ac-
tions or omissions or a combination of both. Whether there has been an interna-
tionally wrongful act depends, first, on the requirements of the obligation 
which is said to have been breached and, secondly, on the framework condi-
tions for such an act, which are set out in Part 1. The term ‘international re-
sponsibility’ covers the new legal relations which arise under international law 
by reason of the internationally wrongful act of a State. The content of these 
new legal relations is specified in Part Two. 
Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Bernhard Graefrath, Complicity in the Law of International Responsibil-
ity, 29 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 370, 372 (1996) (Belg.). Although the 
author’s comments are made on the basis of an earlier draft of the ILC Norms on State 
Responsibility, they remain opportune. See Crawford, supra note 47, at 146–147 (stating 
that the responsibility for complicity is “in a sense derivative”). 
 64. Clapham, supra note 57, at 67–68. 
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limited to the criminalization of a very limited number of heinous acts.65 
This situation, complemented by the absence of a mature set of primary 
international norms against human rights abuses by corporations, de-
prives the analogy of law technique of an adequate practical effect. 
Last but not least, it is important to note that the absence of a frame-
work explicitly regulating state complicity in private wrongfulness does 
not come free of consequences. First, there is always the danger of im-
prudently widening the concept of “de facto organ.”66 Second, concep-
tual expansions in legal scholarship have already caused confusion be-
tween the concepts of due diligence and complicity.67 In fact, the divid-
ing line between the facilitation of a wrongful act (complicity) and the 
failure to attempt to prevent or prohibit the act by available means (due 
diligence) may be much finer than assumed. As such, the issue of com-
plicity between states and corporations in human rights abuses will also 
be omitted from the analysis that follows, and the focus will fix on the 
extent that inadequate due diligence on behalf of the state authorities, can 
give rise to international responsibility. 
II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE 
Such an endeavor entails two assumptions: (1) the rebuttable presump-
tion that business practice is completely independent from any type of 
State influence and (2) the assumption that positive international law sets 
such state obligations. The analysis that follows aspires to prove the exis-
tence of a set of relevant primary international obligations for the state of 
origin, the violation of which leads to the state’s international responsi-
bility for the human rights abuses committed by its investors in the terri-
tory of a third state, even though the abuses are not attributable to the 
state. 
As defined above, the due diligence principle of international law pro-
vides that every state should, to the best of its respective ability, fight 
                                                                                                                                     
 65. The ILC explains in its Commentaries on Article 58 of the ILC Norms on State 
Responsibility that “so far the principle has operated in the field of criminal responsibili-
ty, but it is not excluded that developments may occur in the field of individual civil re-
sponsibility.” See Crawford, supra note 47, at 312. The United States’ Alien Tort Claims 
Act (the “ATCA”) provides a good example. Although it produces its effects at the do-
mestic level, the ATCA makes a positive contribution towards developments in the field 
of individual civil responsibility on the international level. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 66. See Eduardo Savarese, Issues of Attribution to States of Private Acts: Between the 
Concept of De Facto Organs and Complicity, 15 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 111–136 
(2005). 
 67. DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 218–19 (Jean Salmon ed., 2001) (Fr.). 
176 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
breaches of international law by implementing preventive and punish-
ment measures.68 It is common knowledge that states may generally be 
held internationally responsible for: (1) their own wrongful acts or omis-
sions (negative duty to abstain from wrongfulness), (2) the wrongful acts 
or omissions of third subjects of international law which are attributable 
to them, or (3) being negligent in their primary/substantive obligation to 
be vigilant, that is, to behave in a way that will aim—through prevention 
or/and ex post facto punishment—at ensuring that no damage will occur 
to the rights of third subjects as a result of situations or of wrongful con-
duct by persons falling into their jurisdiction (positive duty to protect). 
This third basis corresponds to due diligence. It is true that, unlike the 
first two legal bases for state responsibility, the due diligence principle 
does not find any explicit legal confirmation in the ILC Norms on State 
Responsibility69 and lacks an objective element.70 Despite that, the fol-
                                                                                                                                     
 68. For a thorough analysis of the concept see RICARDO PISILLO MAZZESCHI, “DUE 
DILIGENCE” E RESPONSABILITÀ INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI (1989). 
 69. It is generally accepted that both the first and the third categories are part and 
parcel of the general prohibition on states to breach an international obligation (found in 
Articles 1, 2 and 12 of the ILC Norms on State Responsibility). The only (implicit) refer-
ence made by the ILC Norms on State Responsibility to due diligence is found in Article 
14(3) which refers to the temporal dimension of the obligations to prevent and according 
to which, the wrongful act for failure to prevent is a continuous one. ILC Norms on State 
Responsibility, supra note 48, art. 14(3). The ILC Commentaries are more instructive, 
particularly in commenting on Articles 9 and 10 of the ILC Norms on State Responsibili-
ty. Article 10(3) of the ILC Norms on State Responsibility—which concerns the attribu-
tion to the state of the wrongful acts of an insurrectional movement which became the 
new government of that state—stipulates that “this article is without prejudice to the at-
tribution to a State of any conduct . . ., which is to be considered an act of that State by 
virtue of articles 4 to 9.” Id. art. 10(3). Accordingly, even before the insurrectional 
movement assumes any governmental functions, its behavior may, pursuant to the Article 
9 “agency in necessity” provision, be directly attributed to the state. In remarking on 
these provisions, the ILC Commentaries explain that “exceptional cases may occur where 
the State was in a position to adopt measures of vigilance, prevention or punishment in 
respect of the movement’s conduct but improperly failed to do so.” Crawford, supra note 
47, at 120. The ILC Commentaries effectively attest to the fact that positive international 
law contains an obligation for states to be vigilant and to adopt measures in order to pre-
vent and punish wrongful private conduct. Thus, it has been correctly argued that, in an 
“agency in necessity” case, “a better rationale for holding the State responsible is its fail-
ure to fulfill its functions.” Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the 
Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 265, 274 (2004). Nonetheless, it is reasonable to ask why a state should, in an 
“agency in necessity” situation, be burdened with the wrongful acts of an entity which—
far from being its organ or acting according to its will—“usurps” its functions. In other 
words, why does the ILC opt to establish a clause of direct attribution to the state of illicit 
conduct that has not been committed by its organs, while there already exists an alterna-
tive legal basis—due diligence—for holding that very same state internationally respon-
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lowing discussion will demonstrate that the foundations of due diligence 
within positive international law are well established and that this prin-
ciple sets up a substantive set of state obligations, taking the form of 
goals to be achieved or of standards to be attained. Accordingly, when it 
comes to business practices that are independent of state influence, the 
due diligence principle should legitimately render a state an active player 
with a positive duty to protect human rights rather than a mere passive 
observer of wrongful acts. But first, some background on the origins of 
the due diligence principle will be instructive. 
A. The Origins of the Due Diligence Standard and Its Twofold Nature 
Although the source of the due diligence principle can be traced to in-
ternational judicial practice long before its indirect confirmation by the 
ICJ,71 it is mainly after that court validated some of its normative expres-
sions that a consensus72 arose within legal scholarship on the idea of con-
                                                                                                                                     
sible? Potentially, the answer is that the obligations stemming from due diligence are—as 
will be discussed below—subject to limitations and circumstances that preclude wrong-
fulness. See infra Part II.C. Furthermore, the term “agency in necessity” actually reflects 
an exceptional “state of necessity”—a situation which calls for higher standards of pro-
tection than those offered by due diligence. Finally, even if the highly improbable situa-
tion of a multinational corporation acting as an “agent in necessity” occurred, the necessi-
ty element found at the basis of the direct attribution of the private conduct to the state 
would lead to holding the host state, and not the state of origin, exclusively. As such, this 
Article looks to the “arena” of primary state obligations, emphasizing due diligence. De-
spite its inherent limits, the concept of due diligence offers the advantage of an ample and 
solid basis to cover each and every internationally wrongful act of the investor. 
 70. See infra Part II.C. 
 71. Providing one of the most classic examples of the application of the due diligence 
principle in pre-ICJ international judicial practice, the 1872 Alabama case involved the 
breach by the United Kingdom of its due diligence obligations in light of its failure to 
comply, through prevention or punishment of the activities of persons found under its 
jurisdiction, with its duties of neutrality in times of maritime war. See THOMAS WILLING 
BALCH, THE ALABAMA ARBITRATION (1900). In the 1928 Island of Palmas case, the tri-
bunal stated that “[t]erritorial sovereignty . . . has as corollary a duty: the obligation to 
protect within the territory the rights of other states.” Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas) 
(U.S. v. Neth.) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) at 9, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/ 
upload/files/Island%20of%20Palmas%20award%20only%20+%20TOC.pdf. For the 
judicial history of the due diligence principle in the twentieth century, see Robert P. Bar-
nidge, The Due Diligence Principle under International Law, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. 
REV. 81, 92–121 (2006).  
 72. Although there seems to be a consensus over the existence of the “generic” con-
cept of due diligence, there are still voices denying its extent or applicability in certain 
fields. See, e.g., John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental 
Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (2002) (challenging the applicability of the due 
diligence concept in environmental law). 
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firming an international principle of customary nature in positive interna-
tional law.73 The ICJ, in the Corfu Channel case, referred to “every 
[s]tate’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other [s]tates.”74 Several years later, in its advi-
sory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
the ICJ provided in very similar terms another confirmation of the prin-
ciple, this time in the field of environmental law.75 According to the dic-
tum in that opinion, there exists “a general obligation of [s]tates to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environ-
ment of other [s]tates or of areas beyond national control.”76 Finally, the 
situation in the occupied Palestinian territories offered the ICJ the possi-
bility of stating, in its opinion, that given the “numerous indiscriminate 
and deadly acts of violence” against the civilian population of Israel, “it 
has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life 
of its citizens.”77 
The absence of an explicit reference by the ICJ to the term “due dili-
gence” finds a possible explanation in the fact that, in substance, this 
concept corresponds to a generic notion—a sort of a matrix from which a 
general type of “pilot” or “guide” obligation derives, which takes a con-
crete content and finds an application in various fields or sub-disciplines 
of international law. The structure of the due diligence model sets up for 
states the dual obligation to punish past and prevent future internationally 
wrongful acts.78 The punitive dimension of due diligence, in turn, reflects 
a twofold objective: (1) to prevent the repetition of the illicit act, and (2) 
if it is continuing, to cease it.79 Due diligence covers a vast portion of 
international law; it spans various subjects and issues,80 including the law 
                                                                                                                                     
 73. It is interesting to note that the ICJ never deemed it necessary to examine the 
customary nature of due diligence since it merely stated the existence of a “general obli-
gation.” 
 74. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (April 9). 
 75. Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226 (July 8). 
 76. Id. at 241–42; see also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 
I.C.J. 7, 41 (Sept. 25) (directly quoting the same dictum). 
 77. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 195 (July 9). 
 78. DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, supra note 67, at 770. 
 79. Since the scope is identical, these two objectives of the due diligence principle 
can be aptly compared with Article 30 of the ILC Norms on State Responsibility which 
imposes a requirement of cessation and non-repetition of illicit conduct by state authori-
ties. 
 80. See Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the 
International Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT’L L. 9, 22–41 (1992) (de-
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of neutrality, environmental law, the security of foreign states and their 
representatives, and, of course, the international protection of human 
rights. 
That being said, it is easy to understand why due diligence is classified 
as a “principle,”81 in that it expresses a general substantive state obliga-
tion that serves as a vehicle for the expansion of the effect to be given to 
specific rules or norms of international law via deductive reasoning.82 
However, it would not be a mistake to describe the due diligence prin-
ciple in terms of an international standard as well. The Dictionnaire de 
droit international public provides two definitions of a “standard” that 
are useful in conceptualizing due diligence. According to the first defini-
tion—which is almost identical to the definition of the term “prin-
ciple” as described above—a standard is a “norm of a high level of ab-
straction and generality, which, although as such cannot be applied with-
out first undergoing concretization, its juridicization is incontestable.”83 
Therefore, be it either a standard or a principle, the due diligence norm 
introduces a general normative framework of positive international law, 
which requires that states adopt affirmative measures for preventing and 
sanctioning internationally unlawful conduct. However, due diligence 
lacks a concrete content and effect until it is applied with regard to a spe-
cific international norm or rule—for example, the protection of human 
rights. 
The second pertinent definition of a “standard” corresponds to the idea 
of minimum requirements. In this sense, a standard is a norm implying 
that there is a “level” to reach or a “model” by which one has to abide 
and with regard to which the evaluation of a situation or of a conduct has 
                                                                                                                                     
tailing the various areas of international law within which the due diligence principle has 
been applied). 
 81. Luigi Condorelli, The Imputability to States of Acts of International Terrorism, 19 
ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 233, 240 (1989). 
 82. DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, supra note 67, at 876–77 (defin-
ing “principle” as: “proposition de portée générale, présentée sous une forme ramassée et 
synthétique, exprimant une norme juridique d’une importance particulière et susceptible 
de servir de fondement à des règles de droit par le biais d’un raisonnement déductif”). But 
see Timo Koivurova, What Is the Principle of Due Diligence?, in NORDIC 
COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 341, 346 
(Jarna Petman & Jan Klabbers eds., 2003) (arguing that due diligence is a “principle of 
equity, triggered when a dispute arises and requiring a more careful balancing of the situ-
ation than the standard juristic approach of finding out whether a state has breached in-
ternational law or not”). 
 83. DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, supra note 67, at 1049 (defining 
a “standard” as a “norme d’un haut niveau d’abstraction et de généralité, et dont le conte-
nu doit être concrétisé pour son application, mais dont la juridicité est incontestée”). 
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to be made.84 To view the due diligence principle as imposing minimum 
standards is to imply the existence of a universally common minimal 
level of affirmative conduct expected of states at the international level. 
Thus, failure to satisfy the due diligence principle amounts to a wrongful 
act by omission, which opens the door to designations of state responsi-
bility at the international level. Furthermore, legal scholars distinguish 
the international principle of due diligence from the concept of “diligen-
tia quam in suis”—that is, the vigilance that a state exercises with respect 
to its own affairs.85 Indeed, demonstrating a level of diligence equivalent 
to that applied at the domestic level is not sufficient to satisfy the mini-
mum standard of conduct set by the international due diligence obliga-
tion.86 
The generic nature of the due diligence principle is a factor decisively 
affecting the determination of the minimum standard of state affirmative 
action in a given field of policy. As mentioned above, since due diligence 
can be seen as a sort of matrix, it can only take on full and concrete 
shape and effect if complemented by a specific rule of international law. 
The nature, the content and the sphere of application of that specific rule 
that is “integrated” or “embodied” into the due diligence matrix is signif-
icant for the content of the due diligence minimum standard itself. In 
other words, the actual content of the standard changes depending on the 
positive law at issue—the “minimum” action that will be sufficient to 
satisfy the due diligence obligation will vary according to the specific 
type of wrong-doing to be prevented or punished, and according to the 
particular circumstances and context that form the backdrop for the 
wrongdoing. The following section outlines how due diligence finds an 
application in the field of human rights protection at international level 
and the effect that both civil and social rights take when applied in its 
light. The examples have been chosen with a focus on clarifying and ex-
pounding upon the theoretical scheme described above. 
B. The Positive Effect of Human Rights under the Due Diligence Stan-
dard 
Before discussing the precise state obligations that arise under the due 
diligence principle with respect to civil and social rights, some back-
ground on the normative quality of human rights will be helpful. Public 
                                                                                                                                     
 84. Id. (providing a second definition of a “standard” as  a “norme impliquant l’idée 
d’un ‘niveau’ à atteindre ou d’un ‘modèle’ auquel il faut se conformer et par rapport au-
quel l’évaluation d’une situation ou d’un comportement doit être opérée” and giving “due 
diligence” as an example). 
 85. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 80, at 41–46 (presenting relevant case law). 
 86. Id. at 41. 
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international law contains a corpus of customary “fundamental” rights of 
the human being, and although the vocabulary of international law does 
not provide a definition of the notion of “fundamental” rights the concept 
forms part of the casual jargon and reflects the notion of universally ac-
cepted rights of human beings. Although a complete and exhaustive 
“bill” of fundamental human rights does not exist at the international 
level, the view that such a bill should, at minimum, include the rights 
enumerated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights enjoys 
wide acceptance among legal scholars.87 Furthermore, it is undoubtedly 
certain that the list of “fundamental” human rights exceeds the rights 
protected by the Universal Declaration. 
The protection of human rights at the international level reflects the es-
sential belief of the whole international community that states, as the 
central subjects of the international legal order, adhere to certain values 
that are generally recognized as common to the entire international socie-
ty. Stated differently, general international law norms regarding human 
rights, customary human rights, or universal human rights imply obliga-
tions erga omnes (i.e., obligations that each state owes to the internation-
al community as a whole).88 Since these are objective, non-synallagmatic 
obligations, they are owed vis-à-vis the entire international community 
and thereby exclude any type of reciprocity. 
Viewed from this framework, Karel Vasak’s famous classification of 
human rights into three “generations” is more than just an empirical 
summary of the historical developments of protection of human rights at 
the international level.89 Through an analogy to the three themes of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 87. Concerning the scholarly reception and the impact of the Universal Declaration in 
institutionalization of the fundamental rights of the individual, see, for example, Jochen 
von Bernstorff, The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law, 19 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 903 (2008). But see A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 299 
(1986) (arguing that the Universal Declaration “in formal terms is not legally binding, but 
possesses only moral and political force”). 
 88. There is a substantive number of human rights (or of special expressions of the 
“fundamental” ones) whose normativity derives exclusively from international conven-
tions. These rights lack a general normative effect and, being “inter-subjective,” they are 
limited to the circle of the contracting instrumentum parties. However, for precisely the 
same reasons that lead to the qualification of general human rights norms as erga omnes, 
human rights obligations deriving from a multilateral international treaty are of erga 
omnes partes nature. 
 89. See Karel Vasak, A 30-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNESCO COURIER, Nov. 1997, at 29; see 
also Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or 
Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 307, 307–310 
(1982) (referring to the unpublished inaugural lecture of Karel Vasak before the Interna-
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French Revolution, Vasak traces the philosophical and historical origins 
and the raison d’être that underlies the international protection of human 
rights through the course of its evolution. Under the Vasak typology, the 
first-generation civil and political rights stem from liberty and produce 
their effect in line with the exigencies of that notion. According to the 
libertarian logic, the primary state obligation is of a negative nature and 
requires that domestic authorities abstain from any interference with in-
dividual liberty. Since the norm is exclusively focused on state’s absten-
tion from action, it therefore results in a “hands-off” status negativus 
policy. In contrast to the line of reasoning derived from libertarian no-
tions, the second-generation’s social and economic rights stem from 
equality. States, under the egalitarian rationale, are required to adopt ne-
cessary positive measures (status positivus) that ensure the enjoyment of 
recognized rights by all humans. Lastly, the normative theme of fraterni-
ty calls for solidarity as the necessary condition for realization of univer-
sal aims reflecting values such as international peace and development. 
Such values can only be promoted collectively through the combined 
efforts of the entire international community. 
1. Civil Rights 
Civil rights were initially formed in a “negative” way, and accordingly, 
only required a minimal level of engagement from the states. Under this 
conceptualization, in order to avoid committing a wrongful act, a state 
simply had to abstain from any interference with individual civil rights. 
As a result, civil rights initially excluded from their semantic field any 
type of positive action.90 The integration of due diligence positive duties 
within the first-generation rights eventually occurred largely through 
judicial practice that was primarily influenced by constitutional theory.91 
                                                                                                                                     
tional Institute of Human Rights entitled “For the Third Generation of Human Rights: 
The Rights of Solidarity” conducted July 2–27 in Strasbourg). 
 90. Unless, of course, the norm’s wording expressly included an obligation to prevent 
or punish. For example, Article 2 of the European Convention sets forth that “everyone’s 
right to life shall be protected by law.” European Convention on Human Rights art. 2, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 91. This is particularly the case with the German theory of Drittwirkung, under the 
terms of which, an individual shall have direct access to justice against another individual 
who violated her or his human rights. Denis Alland explains that the libertarian idea rules 
equally the positive obligations for the protection of civil rights—since the individual 
abandoned his or her natural liberty in favor of the state, the latter is under a positive 
obligation to protect the individual against third individuals. Denis Alland, Observations 
sur le devoir international de protection de l’individu, in LIBERTÉS, JUSTICE, TOLÉRANCE: 
MÉLANGES EN HOMMAGE AU DOYEN GÉRARD COHEN-JONATHAN 13 (L. Condorelli ed., 
2004). Samantha Besson in turn places the emphasis on—among other—human dignity. 
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This development was gradual and reflected the necessity of providing 
individuals with maximum protection of their human rights. Through this 
evolution, the semantic field of the norms protecting civil rights was ex-
panded in a way that would develop a broader practical effectiveness 
(effet utile).92 The emphasis was explicitly placed on the teleology, fo-
cusing on the “aim and purpose” of the norm. A “dynamic” reading of 
the norm enabled its content to be continuously redefined, allowing it to 
be adapted to the social momentum at the time, as well as to the particu-
lar circumstances of a given case. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“ICHR”) perfectly sum-
marized the nature of the positive duties that states have under the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and described their rela-
tion to the due diligence principle in its very famous Velasquez Rodri-
guez case.93 There, the Court stated: 
[I]n principle, any violation of rights recognized by the Convention car-
ried out by an act of public authority or by persons who use their posi-
tion of authority is imputable to the state. However, this does not define 
all the circumstances in which a state is obligated to prevent, investi-
gate and punish human rights violations, nor all the cases in which the 
state might be found responsible for an infringement of those rights. An 
illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not direct-
ly imputable to a state (for example, because it is the act of a private 
person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can 
lead to international responsibility of the state, not because of the act it-
self, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or 
to respond to it as required by the Convention.94 
With respect to the question of how the due diligence principle is con-
cretely applied in the field of human rights, the Velasquez Rodriguez 
Court noted that states have the obligation 
to “ensure” the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the 
Convention to every person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation 
                                                                                                                                     
Samantha Besson, Les obligations positives de protection des droits fondamentaux: Un 
essai en dogmatique comparative, 122 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 49, 72–
73 (2003). For a comparative perspective, see Besson, supra, at 57–96. 
 92. Frédéric Sudre, Les “obligations positives” dans la jurisprudence européenne des 
droits de l’homme, in PROTECTION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: LA PERSPECTIVE EUROPÉENNE 
– MELANGES A LA MÉMOIRE DE ROLV RYSSDAL 1359, 1361 (Paul Mahoney, Franz Mats-
cher, H. Petzold and Luzius Wildhaber eds., 2000). 
 93. Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988) 
(July 29, 1988) (the case concerned the detention and subsequent disappearance of a 
Honduran student). 
 94. Id. ¶ 172. 
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implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental ap-
paratus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is 
exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and 
full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation, 
the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the 
rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt 
to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for 
damages resulting from the violation.95 
Likewise, the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), which monitors the 
implementation of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”), described the ICCPR obligations as both negative and 
positive in nature. 96 With respect to the positive dimension of the obliga-
tions, the HRC noted that states are expected to “adopt legislative, judi-
cial, administrative, educative, and other appropriate measures in order to 
fulfill their legal obligations.”97 Furthermore, according to the HRC, 
the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will 
only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not 
just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against 
acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the en-
joyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to applica-
tion between private persons or entities. There may be circumstances in 
which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would 
give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of 
States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the 
harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.98 
For its part, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), despite 
having developed a rich case law on positive human rights duties as early 
as the 1970s, provided only a general basis for the status positivus effect 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (the “European Conven-
tion”) in the Ilaşcu judgment.99 Article 1 of the European Convention, 
which sets forth the general obligations of states to secure for everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights protected by the European Convention, 
is the basis of the various and multiple expressions of the due diligence 
                                                                                                                                     
 95. Id. ¶ 166. 
 96. United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Na-
ture of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 6, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 25, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 
31]. 
 97. Id. ¶ 7. 
 98. Id. ¶ 8. 
 99. Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179. 
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principle within the ECHR’s case law. Although the Ilaşcu Court made 
no express reference to the due diligence principle, it did state that “[t]he 
undertakings given by a [c]ontracting [s]tate under Art. 1 of the [Euro-
pean] Convention include, in addition to the duty to refrain from interfer-
ing with enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed, positive obli-
gations to take appropriate steps to ensure respect for those rights and 
freedoms within its territory.”100 
Thereby, through the principle of due diligence, positive duties of 
states to prevent and punish violations of first-generation rights found 
their place next to “classic” negative obligations. However, the line be-
tween prevention and punishment is somewhat blurred where prevention 
policy is pursued through sanctions that aim to deter wrongful conduct. 
In general, the affirmative action of state authorities should simply aim to 
end ongoing human rights abuses and prevent their repetition. 
The need for positive protection arises in situations where the enjoy-
ment by citizens of their civil rights is threatened by something other 
than state acts.101 With respect to human rights abuses by third parties 
(such as foreign investors), the first-generation norm creates an affirma-
tive “quasi-horizontal” effect, which imposes an obligation upon the state 
to adopt—for the benefit of subjects under its jurisdiction—the necessary 
                                                                                                                                     
 100. Ilaşcu, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 263. 
 101. The concept of threats caused by reasons other than state acts includes both 
threats caused by the conduct of individuals, as well as threats coming from natural phe-
nomena or general situations. Concerning this second dimension, see the case law pre-
sented by Besson, supra note 91, 79–80. The case-law of the ECHR presents several 
examples of situations which are not the result of the conduct of a third subject. See gen-
erally A.R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2004) (detailing ECHR case law on positive obligation, including cases discussing offi-
cial recognition of transsexuals, the official recognition of the choice of names, and the 
provision of free of charge legal assistance). The first and most famous case in this cate-
gory was Marckx v. Belgium which involved the legal status of children born outside of a 
marriage. The ECHR explained that  
[b]y proclaiming in paragraph 1 the right to respect for family life, Article 8 
signifies firstly that the State cannot interfere with the exercise of that right 
otherwise than in accordance with the strict conditions set out in paragraph 2. . . 
. the object of the Article is ‘essentially’ that of protecting the individual 
against arbitrary interference by the public authorities . . . . Nevertheless it does 
not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to 
this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent 
in an effective ‘respect’ for family life.”  
Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1979). 
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positive measures for prevention and prohibition of human rights abuses 
by third parties.102 
In juxtaposition to the classic “vertical”103 dimension of the protection, 
which allows the individual to bring claims against the state for wrongful 
conduct in violation of individual rights which is directly attributable to 
it, the indirect horizontal aspect of the protection permits the individual 
to bring a similar legal claim (for violation of his or her substantive 
rights) against the state where the state authorities failed to demonstrate 
due diligence by reasonably preventing and/or punishing behavior com-
mitted by a third party (even though such third-party acts or omissions 
are not directly attributable to the state). However, this horizontal effect 
is indirect104 and, therefore, it does not extend to the point where the vi-
olated individual is authorized to bring a legal claim directly against the 
third party on the basis of a violation of an international human rights 
norm.105 
The ECHR confirmed the indirect horizontal effect of the European 
Convention on several occasions, including the widely cited X and Y case 
regarding a prohibition on individuals from initiating criminal proceed-
ings within the Dutch legal order against a person who sexually abused a 
mentally handicapped minor.106 The ECHR pointed out that the European 
Convention is “designed to secure respect for private life even in the 
sphere of relations of individuals between themselves,” and found the 
respondent state responsible for failing to adopt positive legislative 
measures that would facilitate the prosecution of an individual violating a 
right protected by the European Convention.107 
Having concluded with the theoretical framework that set forth the ef-
fect of due diligence on civil rights, it is necessary to turn the analysis 
                                                                                                                                     
 102. Dean Spielmann, Obligations positives et effet horizontal des dispositions de la 
Convention, in L’INTERPRÉTATION DE LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE 
L’HOMME 133 (Frédéric Sudre ed., 1998). 
 103. The vertical dimension of human rights protection stems from the status negati-
vus effect of human rights norms. If state organs unlawfully interfere with the rights of 
the individual, then that individual is entitled to bring claims against the state for its in-
ternationally wrongful conduct. 
 104. Spielmann, supra note 102. 
 105. General Comment No. 31, supra note 96, ¶ 8. 
 106. X and Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8–9 (1985). 
 107. Id. at 11, 22; see also Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben”, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 12 (1988) (“Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be 
reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative concep-
tion would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11. Like Article 8, 
Article 11 sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of rela-
tions between individuals, if need be.”). 
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toward a more concrete “case-study,” that will illustrate how the sphere 
of application of a given civil right is in practice expanded through due 
diligence and develop the consequent concrete state obligations. Argua-
bly, from the perspective of due diligence, the most thoroughly examined 
human right is the “right to life.” The right to life is referred to in Article 
2 of the European Convention, which expressly requires that states must 
prevent violations of this right.108 Therefore, as noted by the ECHR, the 
preventive dimension of the obligation requires 
[s]tate[s] not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of 
life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within its jurisdiction . . . . This involves a primary duty on the [s]tate 
to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law pro-
visions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed 
up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and 
punishment of breaches of such provisions.109 
However, as illustrated by the Kiliç case, a state’s positive obligations 
to prevent violations of the right to life, are not only limited to the adop-
tion of criminal legislation. In Kiliç, the ECHR condemned the respon-
dent state (Turkey) for the failure of its authorities to seriously investi-
gate the circumstances surrounding the death of a journalist working for 
a pro-Kurdish newspaper.110 According to the Court, the negligence of 
the state authorities undermined the effectiveness of the domestic crimi-
nal legislation which aimed at preventing right to life abuses.111 
Ex ante police action aimed at protection of the right to life consists of 
another type of positive measures aiming at preventing a violation of the 
right to life. Although they reach seemingly contradictory conclusions, 
two ECHR cases—Osman and Mahmut Kaya—are particularly illustra-
tive of this potential necessity for positive measures and the conditions 
that guide that necessity. While in the Osman case the ECHR held that 
the failure of the state’s police authorities to prevent an individual’s 
death did not result in a violation of the right to life,112 in the Mahmut 
Kaya case the ECHR found that the failure of the Turkish authorities to 
prevent the death of an individual did in fact constitute a breach of the 
European Convention.113 
                                                                                                                                     
 108. See supra note 90. 
 109. Kiliç v.Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, 96. 
 110. Id. at 98–100. 
 111. Id. at 99. 
 112. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3123, 3162–63. 
 113. Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 181. 
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While the cases appear inconsistent, the ECHR did in fact apply the 
same standard in both, and the divergence in results stems from the dif-
ference in the nature of the risk to human life present in each case. In the 
Osman case, which concerned the assassination of a person by his son’s 
obsessive former teacher, the Court found that the applicants failed to 
demonstrate that the police “did not do all that could be reasonably ex-
pected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they 
have or ought to have knowledge.”114 In contrast, the ECHR in the Mah-
mut Kaya case, which also involved an assassination of an individual 
(but this time, likely perpetrated by contra-guerilla groups in southern 
Turkey), the findings of the ECHR led to the conclusion that “in the cir-
cumstances of this case[,] the authorities failed to take reasonable meas-
ures available to them to prevent a real and immediate risk to the life.”115 
The juxtaposition of these two cases is important as it aims to stress the 
fact that positive obligations of states are not limitless. While the limits 
of positive obligations will be addressed in more detail below,116 it bears 
mentioning that, whereas in general there are concrete “tools” for assess-
ing the elasticity or legality of the limitations resulting from state interfe-
rences in circumstances that implicate negative obligations, such an as-
sessment in cases of due diligence positive obligations is considerably 
different as it raises the issue of minimum standards.117 As mentioned 
above, the minimum standards for state vigilance in protecting human 
rights can take shape with a concrete definition only if interpreted in light 
of the ad hoc circumstances of a specific situation. Although internation-
al judicial practice has proposed certain criteria to be taken into account 
when assessing the limits of positive obligations, these criteria are far 
from being complete and they fail to introduce an overall “mechanism” 
of interpretation. 
2. Social Rights 
In contrast to first-generation rights, the origin (or, terminus a quo) of 
social rights is the status positivus rationale that requires state authorities 
                                                                                                                                     
 114. Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3160. 
 115. Mahmut Kaya, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 181. 
 116. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 117. In fact, these two concepts—”limitations” and “minimum standards” of rights—
reflect equally the idea of a “narrowed” sphere of protection of a given right. Since the 
status negativus of a norm presumes an obligation to generally abstain from interference, 
the permissible reduction of its semantic field leads to a limitation. On the contrary, the 
positive obligations depend upon the condition that the state is in a position to provide the 
necessary means for protecting human rights. Since the presumption is reversed, the term 
“minimum standards” seems to be more suitable. 
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to provide (or make available) benefits to individuals that ensure the en-
joyment of a certain level of standard of living. Although it shares simi-
larities with the civil rights affirmative obligations stemming from due 
diligence, the status positivus dimension of social rights pursues a differ-
ent objective and, as such, corresponds to a distinct category of state ob-
ligations. While state authorities are expected to actively engage in the 
protection of human rights in both cases, in the case of civil rights’ dili-
gent affirmative conduct, the pursued aim is to prevent a violation of a 
given right whose enjoyment is threatened not by state acts or omissions, 
but by a third party (e.g., a private actor) action. On the other hand, posi-
tive measures adopted within the framework of the traditional status po-
sitivus dimension of social rights aim to provide the individual with cer-
tain resources, benefits, and/or entitlements to goods or services, which 
are considered to be vital for the individual’s “well-being.” However a 
classic social right obligation can develop beyond its pure status positi-
vus dimension and effectively move in the direction of an affirmative due 
diligence obligation. 
As originally conceived, social rights were meant to correspond to 
rights that were to be realized progressively and to reflect the idea of a 
welfare state.118 Accordingly, while social rights have been “shielded” 
with the binding force of a norm, they also have been provided with a 
mechanism for “disarmament.” Considering the progressive nature of 
                                                                                                                                     
 118. In the terms of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), each state agrees to take steps “to the maximum of its available re-
sources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adop-
tion of legislative measures.” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
Article 2(1), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cescr.pdf. According to 
U.N. Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “CESCR”),  
[t]he concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that 
full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be 
able to be achieved in a short period of time. . . . Nevertheless, the fact that rea-
lization over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen under the Cove-
nant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful 
content. . . . the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed 
the raison d’être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for 
States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It thus 
imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible to-
wards that goal.  
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment No. 3 – The 
Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par. 1), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990 (Dec. 
14, 1990) 
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social rights, it is important to point out that there is a fine line between 
declarative manifestation of good intentions and judicially enforced 
rights. This dividing line separates pure social policy,119 which depends 
on the will and priorities of a given government (as well as, of course, 
the applicable political model or the ideology),120 from the concept of a 
judicially protected minimum “acquis social.” Assuming arguendo that 
there exists a “core” acquis social, whose undermining engages, in legal 
terms, the responsibility of state authorities at the international level, the 
problems remains that the minimum standards of that acquis are far from 
being objective and universally recognized.121 Rather, the minimum 
                                                                                                                                     
 119. See, e.g., Chapman v. United Kingdom, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 41.  
It is important to recall that Article 8 does not in terms recognise a right to be 
provided with a home. Nor does any of the jurisprudence of the Court acknowl-
edge such a right. While it is clearly desirable that every human being have a 
place where he or she can live in dignity and which he or she can call home, 
there are unfortunately in the Contracting States many persons who have no 
home. Whether the State provides funds to enable everyone to have a home is a 
matter for political not judicial decision. 
Id. at 73. 
 120. As the United Nations’ Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
[CESCR] noted,  
in terms of political and economic systems the Covenant is neutral and its prin-
ciples cannot accurately be described as being predicated exclusively upon the 
need for, or the desirability of a socialist or a capitalist system, or a mixed, cen-
trally planned, or laisser-faire economy, or upon any other particular approach. 
In this regard, the Committee reaffirms that the rights recognized in the Cove-
nant are susceptible of realization within the context of a wide variety of eco-
nomic and political systems. 
General Comment No. 3, supra note 119, at ¶ 8. Nonetheless, no one can deny that the 
political and economic system adopted by a polity has a strong impact on the nature, 
extent, and effectiveness of its welfare services. Regarding the political philosophy di-
mensions of the issue, see, for example, Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: 
Positive Duties and Positive Rights, 2006 PUB. L. 498, 505–508 (2006). 
 121. In one of its general comments, the CESCR interprets the ICESCR in a way that 
introduces minimum standards.  
Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals 
is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic 
shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, 
failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to 
be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it 
would be largely deprived of its raison d’être. 
General Comment No. 3, supra note 119, at ¶ 10. Nonetheless, the extent of these mini-
mum standards depends upon the means of which a state disposes.  
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standards would depend upon the state’s level of development and the 
means at the state’s disposal. As such, those minimum standards are like-
ly to diverge from one national legal order to another. 
The classic question of the extent of justiciability of social rights has 
led to a search for alternative legal bases that can, to a certain degree, 
accommodate the aims of social rights indirectly.122 At the international 
level, this trend was reinforced by the absence of mechanisms for the 
protection of social rights accessible by the individual that would be as 
effective as those existing at the regional and global levels for the en-
forcement of civil rights. The justiciability of a given right—even 
through an alternative civil right legal “etiquette”—is closely connected 
with effective implementation of that right. Accordingly, within certain 
limits, this “contrivance” has proven in a number of cases to be success-
ful and has resulted in first-generation norms acquiring, besides their 
original “genuine” civil or political content, a new “pseudo-social” appli-
cation.123 
While, as a result of being read under the “magnifying lenses” of effec-
tiveness, this interpretation manages to cover objectives that fall mainly 
within the field of classic social rights, what remains certain is the fact 
                                                                                                                                     
By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State 
has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource 
constraints applying within the country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each 
State party to take the necessary steps “to the maximum of its available re-
sources.” In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at 
least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must dem-
onstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its dis-
position in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obliga-
tions. 
Id. 
 122. The ECHR has explicitly recognized the plurality of pertinent legal bases for 
accommodating one and the same situation. In its own words:  
The Court is aware that the further realisation of social and economic rights is 
largely dependent on the situation—notably financial—reigning in the State in 
question. . . . Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and po-
litical rights, many of them have implications of a social or economic nature. 
The Court therefore considers . . . that the mere fact that an interpretation of the 
Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should 
not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no water-tight 
division separating that sphere from the field covered by the Convention. 
Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14–15 (1979). 
 123. Undoubtedly, this was the product of what the international judge aimed for every 
time that he or she proceeded with an expansive interpretation and, thereby, allowed the 
sphere of the civil right norm that was invoked by the applicant to be broadened. 
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that such “genetic modification” of the “DNA” of the “alternative” civil 
right legal basis could not be effected unless its actual “nature” allowed 
this to occur. The schematization of the relationship between the main-
stream and the alternative legal basis may be aptly illustrated by the trac-
ing of two homocentric circles, where the narrower circle corresponds to 
the alternative norm and the broader circle to the mainstream legal basis. 
If, for any reason, the mainstream norm fails to produce a satisfactory 
effect, the enlargement of the narrower circle may allow for the coverage 
of certain situations that were originally envisaged as falling into the 
broader circle. However, the conditio sine qua non for such an enlarge-
ment of the alternative norm circle is that both circles are homocentric 
(i.e., they share a common semantic center ratione materiae). According-
ly, the core of the two norms, if not identical, must at least be sufficiently 
similar to accommodate contiguous factual situations. For example, it is 
possible that the right to health may, under certain conditions, be appro-
priately accommodated under the right to life. 
However, there are consequences to such a shift. With respect to the 
right to life, the social, status positivus dimension of that right, which, in 
its lato sensu conception requires the state to progressively build up the 
necessary apparatus to protect the health and life of its citizens, effective-
ly relinquishes its place to the actionable obligation of diligence under 
the legal basis of civil right to life. This, in turn, limits the obligations of 
the state authorities to providing to the patient the means available at that 
specific point in time. Accordingly, if the right to health is to be con-
ceived stricto sensu, the affirmative conduct in light of due diligence is 
absolutely identical in both its social and civil right legal bases. 
The Botta case, which involved the right to private life being invoked 
before the ECHR as the alternative available legal basis for protecting a 
right that is social in its substance, provides a good example of the ho-
mocentric circle illustration.124 The Botta applicant, a person with physi-
cal disability, alleged a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention 
due to the difficulties in accessing the beach and sea while vacation-
ing.125 Interestingly, the situation described in his application had both a 
“general” affirmative dimension, as well as, an indirect horizontal di-
mension, because the applicant was prevented from accessing both pub-
lic and private beaches.126 However, the Botta Court declined to enlarge 
the sphere of the civil right to private life protected by the European 
                                                                                                                                     
 124. Botta v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 412. 
 125. Id. at 416–20. 
 126. Id. at 416. Private beaches are required, under domestic law, to be equipped with 
necessary facilities for persons with disabilities. Id. 
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Convention to such an extent that it would cover the allegations of the 
applicant, noting that 
the right to gain access to the beach and the sea at a place distant from 
[the applicant’s] normal place of residence during his holidays, con-
cerns interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate scope that 
there can be no conceivable direct link between the measures the state 
was urged to take in order to make good the omissions of the private 
bathing establishments and the applicant’s private life.127 
The Court effectively avoided drawing a distinction between access to 
private and public beaches, which are differentiated mainly on the basis 
of the standard of conduct that would suffice for ensuring the enjoyment 
of the right by the applicant.128 Whereas construction of the necessary 
facilities on public beaches falls into the broader scope of progressive 
realization of social rights, the indirect horizontal dimension would be 
satisfied by state implementation of national legislation imposing a re-
quirement on private beaches to facilitate access to persons with disabili-
ty. The adoption of such domestic legislation would constitute a preven-
tive positive measure that clearly falls within the concept of due dili-
gence. 
The ECHR clarified its position with respect to the general affirmative 
dimension of social rights under a civil “labeling” in the Sentges case.129 
The applicant in Sentges, an individual suffering from progressive mus-
cle degeneration, brought a right to private life claim against the state 
after state authorities rejected his request for a robotic arm, which would 
reduce his dependency on third persons. In deciding against the appli-
cant, the ECHR, after referring to the conditions according to which af-
firmative conduct is envisaged under the right to private life, emphasized 
                                                                                                                                     
 127. Id. at 423; see also Zehnalová and Zehnal v. Czech Republic, 2002-V Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 336. There, the Court declared as inadmissible the allegations of the applicants, who 
were claiming a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights due 
to the lack of disability options in buildings providing public services. Id. at 347–53. 
According to the Court, the link between private life and the affirmative conduct required 
by the state must be direct and immediate. As the Court explained,  
Its task is to determine the limits to the applicability of Article 8 and the boun-
dary between the rights set forth in the Convention and the social rights guaran-
teed by the European Social Charter. . . . However, the sphere of State interven-
tion and the evolutive concept of private life do not always coincide with the 
more limited scope of the State’s positive obligations.  
Id. at 351–52. 
 128. Botta, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 420–24. 
 129. Sentges v. Netherlands, App. No. 27677/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 8, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng. 
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the discretion accorded by the European Convention to states where a 
given situation involves “an assessment of the priorities in the context of 
the allocation of limited state resources.”130 It arguably follows then, that 
the general affirmative dimension of a given right is, in its “core” con-
ception, limited, and does not extend to such a degree as to transform 
into a pure status positivus social entitlement. 
In a particularly pertinent case, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”) discussed the indirect horizontal dimen-
sion of social rights.131 The case involved the potential state imposition 
of affirmative measures against a multinational corporation, which, ac-
cording to the allegation, formed an oil consortium with the state oil 
company and exploited oil reserves in Nigeria with detrimental conse-
quences for the environment, as well as, for the health of the local popu-
lation.132 Finding multiple violations of Nigeria’s international human 
rights obligations, the ACHPR noted that the respondent state “has given 
the green light to private actors . . . to devastatingly affect the well-being 
of the Ogonis,” the local population.133 With respect to the right to food, 
the ACHPR declared that this right “is implicit in the African Charter, in 
such provisions as the right to life, the right to health and the right to 
economic, social and cultural development.”134 Furthermore, the Com-
mission stated, 
The African Charter and international law require[s] and bind[s] Nige-
ria to protect and improve existing food sources and to ensure access to 
adequate food for all citizens. Without touching on the duty to improve 
food production and to guarantee access, the minimum core of the right 
to food requires that the Nigerian Government should not destroy or 
contaminate food sources. It should not allow private parties to destroy 
                                                                                                                                     
 130. Sentges v. Netherlands, App. No. 27677/02 (July 8, 2003), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlig
ht=Sentges&sessionid=42116821&skin=hudoc-en; see also Olivier De Schutter, Reason-
able Accommodations and Positive Obligations in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in DISABILITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 35, 42 (Anna Law-
son & Caroline Gooding eds., 2005) (referring to the problem of “polycentricity”—i.e., 
the unavoidable social side-effects that the adjudication of such type of social remedies 
will have for the interests of other social groups equally needing to benefit from limited 
state resources). 
 131. Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. and Ctr. for Soc. and Econ. Rights v. Nigeria, 
Commc’n No. 155/96, (Afr. Comm’n of Human & Peoples’ Rts., Oct. 27, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=404115. 
 132. Id. ¶ 1–9. 
 133. Id. ¶ 58. 
 134. Id. ¶ 64 (internal citations omitted). 
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or contaminate food sources, and prevent peoples’ efforts to feed them-
selves.135 
In concluding, the ACHPR held that the respondent state breached its 
right to food obligation because it “allowed private oil companies to de-
stroy food sources.”136 
The Powell and Rayner case provides another example concerning the 
indirect horizontal dimension of essentially social rights.137 In that case, 
the ECHR was asked to decide whether sonar pollution produced by the 
Heathrow airport amounted to an infringement of the right of the appli-
cants to the respect of their private life and home protected by Article 8 
of the European Convention.138 The Court held that Article 8 applied to 
the applicants, as the quality of their private lives and the possibility for 
them to enjoy the amenities of their respective homes had been af-
fected.139 Because the airport had been privatized, the question raised 
was whether the Court should examine the alleged violation under the 
status negativus or under the affirmative (due diligence) dimension of the 
right to respect of private life and home. According to the Court, 
Whether the present case be analyzed in terms of a positive duty on the 
State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the appli-
cants’ rights under paragraph 1 of article 8 or in terms of an “interfe-
rence by a public authority” to be justified in accordance with para-
graph 2, the applicable principles are broadly similar. In both contexts 
regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a 
whole.140 
After proceeding with the proportionality test,141 the ECHR concluded 
that, given the importance of the airport to the public interest and the 
positive measures adopted by the respondent government (such as re-
                                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. ¶ 65. 
 136. Id. ¶ 66. 
 137. Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1990). 
 138. Id. at 7–13. 
 139. Id. at 18. 
 140. Id. 
 141. On the issue of proportionality, see discussion infra Part II.C. The same propor-
tionality test was applied in a similar case of López Ostra. López Ostra v. Spain, App. 
No. 16798/90, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 15–16, available at http://www.echr.coe/int/eng. There, 
the applicant was protesting, on the basis of Article 8 of the European Convention, 
against emission of noxious gases by a private tannery waste reprocessing plant that was 
constructed next to the applicant’s house. Id. ¶ 7–9. 
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strictions on night flights and aircraft noise monitoring), there was no 
violation of the rights of the applicants.142 
With respect to the right to work, the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) noted that “[t]he obliga-
tion to protect the right to work includes the responsibility of States par-
ties to prohibit forced or compulsory labor by non-State actors.”143 Inte-
restingly, an equivalent obligation is imposed on states on the basis of 
the civil right that prohibits forced labor or servitude. Utilizing this legal 
“etiquette,” the applicant in the Siliadin case, a female minor unlawfully 
present in a foreign country, brought her case before the ECHR claiming 
a violation of the European Convention due to the failure of the respon-
dent state to protect her from her employers, who were forcing her to 
work without pay for more than fifteen hours per day.144 The ECHR re-
viewed the quality of domestic legislation criminalizing behaviors like 
the one to which the applicant was subjected, and concluded that the ex-
isting legislation did not deal specifically with the right guaranteed by 
the European Convention and therefore failed to provide effective penal-
ties.145 Consequently, the Court held that the respondent state failed to 
comply with its obligation to punish the breach of a specific expression 
of the right to work by third-party individuals.146 
Finally, it bears noting that social rights include negative aspects as 
well as their original status positivus dimension.147 However, the effect 
of social rights vis-à-vis diligent affirmative behavior should be distin-
guished from their mainstream status positivus dimension. Additionally, 
it should be noted that, to the extent diligence is developed against a 
“general” situation (excluding the conduct of a third-party individual), 
the notion that diligent conduct and the broader status positivus are iden-
tical is limited only to the core field of the norm. By contrast, the status 
positivus dimension of a social right extends beyond the obligation of 
demonstrating simple diligence and moves in the direction of a progres-
sive fulfillment. Despite the problem of justiciability, the pure status po-
sitivus sphere of a social right norm requires the progressive realization 
                                                                                                                                     
 142. Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7–13. 
 143. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment No. 18 – 
The Right to Work, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Nov. 24, 2005). 
 144. Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 340–47. 
 145. Id. at 372–73. 
 146. Id. at 373. 
 147. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment 
No. 15 – The Right to Water, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
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of its objectives.148 Accordingly, a social right norm, without excluding 
the prevention and punishment of situations threatening its enjoyment 
(the due diligence aspect), aspires to create the ideal circumstances under 
which the right to an entitlement can become equally accessible to all 
members of a given society.149 Additionally, as far as the indirect hori-
zontal dimension (under due diligence) of a social right is concerned, its 
nature, function, and logic are similar in both civil and social rights.150 
Having concluded with the presentation of the effect that due diligence 
has over civil and social rights, at this point, it is helpful to examine the 
limits of the scheme presented thus far in this Article. 
C. Limits on the Primary Obligations of the “Home” State 
As explained above, the due diligence principle is merely a vehicle. In 
order to express or impose a more concrete duty, that vehicle must be 
fitted with a separate substantive international legal norm (a “protected 
right”). This two-layer configuration results in limits to a given applica-
tion of the principle potentially arising at two separate levels. This sec-
tion considers the limits inherent at both levels, as well as potential limits 
arising, more specifically, from the rights of investors. 
1. Limits Inherent to the Due Diligence Principle 
At the macro level of the due diligence principle, states are expected, 
pursuant to their “duty to protect,” to make every possible effort toward 
affirmative action. Nonetheless, states are not expected to guarantee a 
given result,151 but rather to merely demonstrate their best efforts in light 
of the means available to them.152 Thus, in domestic law, a distinction is 
drawn between “obligations of result” and “obligations of means.”153 
                                                                                                                                     
 148. Although it is relatively easy to identify where the obligation begins, it is imposs-
ible to know where it ends. Therefore, it is difficult to define the “distance” separating the 
obligations stemming from due diligence with the broader mainstream status positivus 
effect of social rights. 
 149. Corresponding to the obligation to fulfill a social right, the concept is distin-
guished in the scholarship from the obligation to protect (diligence). 
 150. As the case law presented so far suggests, under due diligence, states are expected 
to effectively prevent and punish any threat to the enjoyment caused by third-party indi-
viduals of both civil and social rights. 
 151. Crawford, supra note 47, at 140. 
 152. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classi-
fication of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsi-
bility, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 371, 378–382 (1999); see also Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 
80, at 46–49. 
 153. Concerning the origins of the classification and its sources in French civil law, see 
Jean Combacau, Obligations de résultat et obligations de comportement. Quelques ques-
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“Obligations of result” require states to guarantee that a given result is in 
accordance with the norms that oblige them to either act or refrain from 
acting in the first place. Where a state fails to obtain such a result, the 
obligation is broken and, consequently, the state’s conduct becomes 
wrongful, regardless of the circumstances under which the failure oc-
curred. By contrast, “obligations of means” merely require that the re-
sponsible subject demonstrate each and every possible effort to achieve 
the desired result. If the result is never reached, the responsibility of the 
state will only be questioned insofar as the state must prove that it em-
ployed all the means reasonably available to it in attempting to obtain the 
desired result. 
The classification of the obligations of due diligence as “obligations of 
means”154 stems from the simple reality that results pursued via diligent 
conduct will frequently hinge on factors beyond the scope of a state’s 
will (i.e., beyond its control). Although a state might make use of all the 
means at its disposal, other factors or circumstances may intervene and 
decisively impact the final outcome. Accordingly, predictability and ef-
fectiveness in state control over a given situation are considered two of 
the most essential factors in evaluating diligent state conduct. However, 
the term “evaluation” implies the existence of a certain degree of subjec-
tivity in the assessment of state actions and omissions. While a state’s 
breach of a negative duty to abstain from wrongfulness imposes an ob-
jective responsibility upon the state, a positive duty of diligent affirma-
tive action triggers a subjective evaluation155 of the conduct to be ex-
pected in light of the given conditions and the extent of the available 
means. Appropriately, all such situations are to be considered in light of 
the specific content of the applicable substantive norm. It follows that 
state responsibility for lack of due diligence will occur only when the 
specific circumstances would have called for a better use of the means at 
                                                                                                                                     
tions et pas de réponse [Result and Conduct Oriented Obligations: A Few Questions 
without an Answer], in MÉLANGES OFFERTS À PAUL REUTER. LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: 
UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ 181, 194–204 (D. Bardonnet et al. eds., 1981). 
 154. In reality, the two terms—”obligation of means” and “obligation of diligent con-
duct”—are synonymous and are used in legal scholarship interchangeably both at nation-
al and international level. See André Tunk, La Distinction des Obligations de Résultat et 
des Obligations de Diligence, 1945 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JURIS-CLASSEUR PÉRIODIQUE)  
449. 
 155. See Pierre M. Dupuy, Le Fait Générateur de la Responsabilité Internationale des 
États, 188 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 21, 102–03 
(1984) (noting that although “objective” international responsibility is the rule, a “subjec-
tive” state fault might be taken into consideration when the primary obligation is to set a 
goal to be achieved); Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 80, at 18–21, 49–50 (citing various 
other authority). 
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the state’s disposal. As such, there is significant space left for a subjec-
tive evaluation of the state’s “fault.” 
Still, if international responsibility for failure to satisfy a due diligence 
standard is dependent upon a subjective appreciation of the specifics cir-
cumstances of a particular case, it is arguable that some minimum stan-
dards must also be set, so as to provide a broad threshold for state action 
in such instances. Defining these standards, however, may be easier said 
than done. For instance, such minimum due diligence standards ought to 
be low enough that they would be attainable by all states, without regard 
to a state’s economic resources. Otherwise, one would still need to per-
form a subjective inquiry into the extent that a use of resources was legi-
timately too burdensome for a state. Such an inquiry would require an 
informal categorization of states with respect to level of development, 
and even then, states would still have to be bound only in relation to cer-
tain common or usual factual circumstances. In practice, the minimum 
standards of diligence are far from objective in absolute terms, rather 
they are multiple and flexible. This applies equally to all categories of 
norms that may rely on diligence practices, including human rights. Even 
fundamental rights, whose status negativus effect is universally accepted, 
are barely susceptible to a standardized minimum of protection common 
to all states under due diligence. This is because a government need only 
prove that the adoption of the positive measures that are necessary under 
due diligence is beyond its capacities. 
2. Limits Inherent to the “Protected Right” 
At the micro level, both civil and social rights are equally able to pro-
duce their results in regard to the principle of due diligence. Affirmative 
action, originating from the generic obligation of due diligence, is distin-
guishable from both the status negativus and the mainstream status posi-
tivus effect given to a human rights norm. Although the status positivus 
dimension of a social right norm shares a common point of departure 
with the affirmative action adopted against a general situation156 under 
that very same norm, it is the actual standard of due diligence that sets 
the limits of the affirmative conduct. Therefore, it is the due diligence 
standard that renders the affirmative action standard discernable from the 
broader sphere of the status positivus effect. Thus, the status positivus 
effect can extend further towards an unlimited progressive fulfillment of 
the objectives of the social norm. The desirable result in terms of dili-
gence is present in cases of both first and second generation human rights 
                                                                                                                                     
 156. That is to say, it does not result is an indirect horizontal effect as against a threat 
caused by a third-party individual. 
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and is parallel to that of the status negativus effect of a norm. Nonethe-
less, the main difference between the status negativus dimension and due 
diligence is that the effect that states are obliged to guarantee through 
abstention from interference reflects an obligation of result, while, in the 
case of affirmative measures of due diligence, the obligation for national 
authorities is limited to their capacities. 
In order for a court to assess whether a state has fulfilled its obligations 
of due diligence in a given situation, the court must first define what type 
of affirmative action was necessary given the nature of the circums-
tances. However, as a threshold matter, the court must examine whether 
the situation experienced by the victim, as well as the victim’s expecta-
tions for benefitting from affirmative action, fall into a right guaranteed 
by the body of positive international law.157 With respect to this analysis, 
the passage from negative to positive obligations is facilitated by the 
“object and purpose” method of interpretation, aiming to extend the ef-
fect of a norm to its full effet utile (or “practical effectiveness”). None-
theless, the effet utile method is just one among several others available 
to an adjudicator and nothing prohibits the choice of another technique of 
interpretation. 
For example, in the Pretty case, the applicant, an individual suffering 
from a progressive neuro-degenerative disease resulting in general para-
lysis, applied to the state authorities for the granting of a positive meas-
ure—permission for her husband to assist her in committing suicide.158 
Invoking the right to life provided in the European Convention, the ap-
plicant argued that the right also included the right to choose whether or 
not to go on living.159 The ECHR, in concluding that the refusal of the 
national authorities to give this permission did not breach their positive 
obligations stemming from the European Convention, proceeded with a 
grammatical reasoning160 focusing on the textual analysis of the norm. 
According to the Court, the right to life “cannot, without a distortion of 
language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, 
namely a right to die.”161 The applicant’s counterargument, that such as-
sistance to suicide is permitted in the national legal order of other coun-
                                                                                                                                     
 157. See supra Part II.B (particularly case law presented therein). 
 158. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 162–63.  
 159. Id. at 184–85. 
 160. This is an interpretative technique that is strongly related to the one focusing on 
the will/intention of the contracting parties—a diametrically opposite technique to that of 
effet utile. See Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 24–25 (1986) (where the 
ECHR concluded that the Convention does not guarantee the right to divorce, since this 
was deliberately omitted by the wording of article 12, establishing the right to marriage). 
 161. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 186. 
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tries, prompted the Court to use another interpretative technique: the 
margin of appreciation.162 Under this method, states have the right to de-
fine a concept of the ECHR at the national level in accordance with the 
legal traditions particular to their domestic legal order. Thus, the court 
reasoned that 
even if circumstances prevailing in a particular country which permit-
ted assisted suicide were found not to infringe Article 2 of the Conven-
tion, that would not assist the applicant in this case, where the very dif-
ferent proposition - that the United Kingdom would be in breach of its 
obligations under article 2 if it did not allow assisted suicide - has not 
been established.163 
In short, the Court found that, while the right to life does not guarantee 
the adoption of positive measures enabling euthanasia, the right does not 
prohibit it either which effectively left the issue up to the states. 
Once it has been established that a situation is covered by the semantic 
field of a particular right, the extent of the state obligation for affirmative 
conduct will then have to be identified. This might properly be seen as 
the process of defining the standard introduced by the human rights norm 
as it relates to the nature of the risk and the particular circumstances of a 
case. 
In its Osman judgment, the ECHR enunciated a set of criteria for judg-
ing the adequacy of a state’s preventive positive measures. These criteria 
include the unpredictability of human conduct, the knowledge of the risk, 
                                                                                                                                     
 162. Generally, the ECHR is reluctant to recognize the existence of positive obliga-
tions for states where there is an absence of consensus reflected by common “principles” 
over an issue at the national level. Nonetheless, nothing prohibits a judge from diagnos-
ing the existence of common obligations for affirmative conduct even in the absence of 
such a consensus. Compare Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1986), with 
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. The Rees v. United Kingdom case 
concerned the question of whether the respondent state was obligated to adopt positive 
measures in order to confer on the applicant, a transsexual, a legal status corresponding to 
his actual condition. The ECHR recognized that, in the absence of consensus, states enjoy 
a margin of appreciation to regulate this type of situation at the domestic level. Rees, 106 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15. By contrast, in Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the ECHR employed, 
despite the absence of a consensus at the European level, a dynamic/evolutive interpreta-
tion and noted that  
the Court . . . attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common Eu-
ropean approach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, 
than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in 
favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal rec-
ognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals. 
Goodwin, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29–30. 
 163. Pretty, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 187. 
202 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
the operational choices, which must be made by the national authorities 
in terms of priorities and resources, the possibility for the authorities to 
provide the necessary measures, as well as the need for proportionali-
ty.164 Obviously, this approach fails to offer a unitary pathway for inter-
pretation. Instead, it seeks to determine the existence of a state’s affirma-
tive obligation by depending on several heterogeneous criteria, which do 
not present the systemic interconnectedness that is necessary for qualify-
ing it as an overall mechanism of interpretation. However, the criteria 
may serve a limited purpose as a set of tools a judge may choose to em-
ploy according to the exigencies of the particular case at hand. In this 
view, judges enjoy discretion in both their choice of the applicable crite-
ria, as well as their subjective evaluation of the facts of the particular 
case. These criteria, then, might be used in a cumulative manner towards 
an overall evaluation of the reasonableness of the expectations that a citi-
zen has for state affirmative conduct. 
In contrast to the aforementioned criteria, which should be applied on-
ly when the particular circumstances justify it, the classic proportionality 
test is more consistently relevant to the due diligence analysis. In the 
field of human rights, the traditional function of the proportionality test is 
to evaluate the necessity and reasonableness of state interference with the 
                                                                                                                                     
 164. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3123, 3159–60; see also 
Benedetto Conforti, Exploring the Strasbourg Case-Law: Reflections on State Responsi-
bility for the Breach of Positive Obligations, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 129, 132 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Dan Sarooshi 
eds., 2004). Conforti introduces the idea of the foreseeability of the risk/threat to the right 
and notes that the “specification of the test of foreseeability” is the “causality test,” ap-
plied to demonstrate the existence of a causal link connecting the risk/threat of the right 
with the facts/situation constituting its source. Conforti, supra, at 132; see, e.g., Mastro-
matteo v. Italy, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 151; L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998-III Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1390. In L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, the ECHR refused to accept that a causal 
link existed between leukemia suffered by the applicant and the exposure of her father to 
radiation when he was a serviceman in an area where nuclear tests were conducted by the 
respondent state. L.C.B., 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1404. The ECHR noted that in the 
absence of scientific proof, the way to subjective appreciation is wide open. Id. In the 
Mastromatteo v. Italy case, the applicant argued before the ECHR that the Italian authori-
ties breached the right to life of his son because they failed to prevent his death, which 
occurred when a group of criminals, who had been granted prison leave, co-opted his car 
in an attempt to escape after a bank robbery. The Court applied the foreseeability test and 
concluded that the death of the applicant’s son was the “result of the chance sequence of 
events” and that there was nothing in the circumstances of the particular case to alert the 
national authorities “to the need to take additional measures.” Mastromatteo, 2002-VIII 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 168. Or, as the respondent state claimed, “the causal link was tenuous . . . 
given the circumstances in which the victim died, namely, following a long series of 
coincidences and, therefore, fortuitous, unforeseen and unforeseeable incidents.” Ma-
stromatteo, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 164–65. 
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rights of an individual so that a suitable equilibrium between the general 
interest and the individual rights can be maintained. Although the ECHR 
has held that the criteria within the European Convention used to justify 
the limitation of a given right in its negative dimension cannot be applied 
to affirmative obligations in the same way,165 the Court has also noted 
that the search for a fair balance between community and individual in-
terests is “inherent in the whole Convention.”166 Therefore, as long as the 
required affirmative action raises issues of conflict between individual 
and general interests, the principle of proportionality becomes applicable 
in order to evaluate the purpose of the positive measures and to assess 
whether their adoption is necessary and reasonable. 
For example, in Rees v. United Kingdom, the Court applied the propor-
tionality test in deciding whether the respondent state had an obligation 
to adopt positive measures to guarantee secrecy concerning the original 
gender of the applicant, who was transsexual.167 After discussing the 
margin of appreciation recognized by various national authorities, the 
Court concluded that third parties, including public authorities, main-
tained a legitimate interest in receiving such information, and, therefore, 
the personal right claimed by the applicant could not extend so broad-
ly.168 
Almost twenty years later, in the Christine Goodwin case, the Court 
once again applied the proportionality test in order to investigate the bal-
ance that should be maintained between the right of a transsexual person 
to legally recognize his or her gender change and the general interest.169 
On this occasion, the Court examined the latter interest from the perspec-
tive of the burden that it would cause for the birth register system, the 
detriment that third parties might suffer in being unable to access the 
original entries, and the complications that would occur in the fields of 
family law, succession law, and social security. Interestingly, the Court 
found the right of the applicant to live in “dignity and worth in accor-
dance with the sexual identity” choice was not of “concrete or substantial 
hardship or detriment to the public interest.”170 Consequently, the Court 
                                                                                                                                     
 165. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15. For a critique, see Sudre, supra note 92, 1373–74. 
 166. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15; see also Powell and Rayner v. U.K., 172 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) 18 (1990); López Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 15, 
available at http://www.echr.coe/int/eng (where the Court stated that “the applicable 
principles are broadly similar” in both the affirmative and the negative dimensions of a 
right). 
 167. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15. 
 168. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18. 
 169. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 31–32. 
 170. Id. 
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departed from its previous case law and concluded that the respondent 
state breached its obligation to protect the applicant’s right to private 
life.171 
The conclusions a court reaches regarding the extent of positive state 
obligations will undergo one last test, carried out at the macro, or gener-
ic, level of the due diligence principle. The baseline for this test is that 
the state has at its disposal the necessary means for providing the meas-
ures that have been considered reasonable in a given case.172 Where a 
state possesses several equally useful means to satisfy the standard of 
diligence identified in a given situation, the recognized margin of discre-
tion may be considered and effectively allows the state authorities the 
discretional power to choose freely among the various available 
means.173 
3. Balancing Human Rights with the (Human) Rights of the Investor 
Human rights are not intended solely to protect local populations from 
the wrongful conduct of investors; rather, human rights call for the equal 
protection of each and every individual. As subjects under international 
law, investors are entitled to general human rights protection,174 as well 
as the protection of those rights that are specific to the identity or role of 
“investor.”175 Therefore, it is possible that states, in their effort to protect 
                                                                                                                                     
 171. Id. at 32. The Goodwin case suggests that state fault for failing to demonstrate 
diligence is far from inter-temporal or location-blind, and may instead arise as the subjec-
tive product of societal momentum. 
 172. Alland, supra note 91, 24. 
 173. Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben”, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1988); see also 
Spielmann, supra note 102, at 141; Sudre, supra note 92, at 1370. 
 174. More importantly, rights of investors extend to protection of property and access 
to justice. 
 175. The debate over the question of whether trade or investment rights equate to hu-
man rights has in the past been extremely animated. One can recall, for instance, the keen 
dialogue between E.U. Petersmann and Ph. Alston. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time 
for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of 
Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621, 
621–650 (2002); Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by 
Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 815–844 (2002); Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals 
More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 845, 845–851 (2002). According 
to Alston, economic liberties, such as investors’ rights, should not been equated to human 
rights as their purpose is fundamentally different. As he claims, “trade-related rights are 
granted to individuals for instrumentalist reasons.” Alston, supra, at 826. Robert Howse 
has also contributed to the above-mentioned dialogue. See Robert Howse, Human Rights 
in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 651, 651–659 (2002). Also, José E. Alvarez, with his humouristic spirit, described the 
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the human rights of the local population through affirmative conduct, 
may end up interfering with the rights of the investor.176 Concomitantly, 
there is the possibility that a state, by neglecting to interfere with the hu-
man rights of the investor, may breach its due diligence obligation to 
protect the human rights of the local population.177 
While there may appear to be a conflict of rights upon first glance, it 
should be understood that a true normative conflict—i.e., a conflict per 
se—between the fundamental human rights is highly unlikely to occur.178 
The term “conflict” is quite often used improperly, particularly when 
used to describe situations raising issues of “priority” in protection. In 
                                                                                                                                     
NAFTA investment chapter as “a human rights treaty for a special-interest group.” José 
E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter 
Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 308 (1996); see also Biloune and Marine 
Drive Complex LTD v. Ghana, 95 I.L.R. 183, 203 (UNCITRAL Arbitration, 1994). 
There, the investor complained, inter alia, about his arbitrary arrest and deportation. Ac-
cording to the tribunal, “contemporary international law recognizes that all individuals, 
regardless of nationality, are entitled to fundamental human rights.” Id. However, the 
tribunal concluded that the investor’s claim fell outside its jurisdiction, which was limited 
to commercial issues. As was explained, “while the acts alleged to violate the interna-
tional human rights of Mr Biloune may be relevant in considering the investment dispute 
under arbitration, this Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to address, as an independent cause of 
action, a claim of violation of human rights.”  Id. 
 176. In their status negativus dimension. 
 177. The state will breach its obligation in the indirect horizontal dimension. 
 178. However, it is possible that a question of priorities in the protection of conflicting 
human rights arises. Taking into account the context and the ad hoc circumstances of the 
case, the role of proportionality is to set these priorities. Of course, a normative conflict 
may well arise between human rights and the specific investment rights of the investor. 
Law offers a number of well-known techniques applicable in the case of a conflict of 
norms, including hierarchy. If a given human right is susceptible to derogations, then 
these might also be justified on the basis of the legitimate aim of the protection of the 
investment rights of the investor. In that case, proportionality comes into play again in 
order to balance the human rights of the local population with the investment rights to 
which a corporation is entitled. Due to the erga omnes nature of human rights, the inves-
tor’s rights may produce their effect only to the extent that they will not disproportion-
ately impede the effectiveness of human rights. This is provided, of course, that a given 
right has not acquired the status of jus cogens in which case, no limitations are permitted. 
See Ursula Kriebaum, Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface between International 
Investment Protection and Human Rights, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - 
LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 165, 168–72 (August Reinisch & Ursula Krie-
baum eds., 2007) (examining various scenarios of potential conflict between the rights of 
the investor and human rights, with an emphasis on social rights and on the right to wa-
ter); Yannick Radi, The Place of Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration? Mak-
ing Use of the International Investment Law ‘Tool-Box’ (on file with author) (describing 
how proportionality functions in the frame of the fair and equitable treatment standard in 
international investments). 
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other words, while the obligations stemming from two different human 
rights norms are not in conflict with each other in the abstract, a conflict 
might arise in situations like the one examined here, where different 
rights are owed to two different subjects and the effective protection of 
one’s rights requires a limitation on the rights of the other. In such a case, 
the question becomes—to what extent should derogations of protection 
be allowed?179 
As argued above, proportionality is the most valuable instrument avail-
able in testing the legality of derogations. Under the principle of propor-
tionality, the necessity of a state’s behavior in both its negative and af-
firmative dimensions is evaluated by balancing the relevant human rights 
against the general societal interest. Accordingly, under a proportionality 
evaluation, when a claimant alleges that state authorities negligently 
failed to implement positive measures to protect him or her from human 
rights abuses perpetrated by a corporation, the necessity of the adoption 
of such affirmative conduct is examined as it relates to the general inter-
est of the society. The general societal interest implicitly and indirectly 
includes respect for the rights of the corporation, which is a vital engine 
for social and economic growth and development.180 Similarly, if the in-
vestor complains about his or her (both human and investor) rights, the 
proportionality test will enable the judge to evaluate the nature and the 
gravity of the state’s interference with the investor’s rights in comparison 
to the general interest that the interference allegedly aims to protect.181 
Here, in turn, the general interest includes ensuring respect of the human 
rights of the local population. 
Except for jus cogens norms, human rights norms are susceptible to 
limitations. Proportionality allows for the ad hoc setting of priorities, as 
it outlines the limits of governmental discretion in: providing freedoms, 
incentives, and prerogatives to the investor; regulating investment activi-
ties; and, more broadly, shaping economic policy. However, liberty or 
discretion in policy-making for governments is automatically excluded if 
the policy is found to interfere disproportionately with human rights. 
Such a balanced approach to this type of dispute allows human rights 
                                                                                                                                     
 179. Provided, of course, that a derogation of a protection is even allowed. In the case 
of the few human rights that enjoy a jus cogens status, no derogation is permitted. 
 180. See, e.g., Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18–
20. 
 181. In the case of expropriation, the proportionality test will come into play in the 
frame of the ECHR in order to assess the amount of compensation. Accordingly, full 
compensation is not always guaranteed. See Matthias Ruffert, The Protection of Foreign 
Direct Investment by the European Convention on Human Rights, 43 GERMAN Y.B. OF 
INT’L LAW 116 (2000). 
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concerns to co-exist with financial interests, while providing a reasonable 
framework for settling legitimate conflicts when they actually arise. 
III. TAKING DUE DILIGENCE BEYOND TERRITORIALITY 
It goes without saying that the responsibility to prevent and deter a 
corporation from perpetrating human rights abuses belongs, first and 
foremost, with the state that hosts the corporation—that is, the state exer-
cising sovereign jurisdiction over the land where the corporation is oper-
ating and where the abuses occur. However, there are two rationales for 
highlighting the parallel obligations that the corporate investor’s state of 
origin bears. First, host states are often developing countries; even if au-
thorities in such states are sensitive to human rights, either their protec-
tive efforts are ineffective182 or they are prone to prioritizing the econom-
ic benefits that corporate activities create and disregarding human rights 
abuses. Second, from a moral standpoint, the state of origin is by no 
means a neutral actor in international investments, as it clearly benefits 
from the investment activities of its citizens abroad. Indeed, states active-
ly promote businesses that originate within their respective legal orders, 
and that means they inherently support domestic investors. At a mini-
mum, states negotiate BITs with the aim of guaranteeing the best possi-
ble conditions and the highest level of security and protection for their 
own investors. 
A democratic state of origin that remains silent in the face of human 
rights abuses perpetrated by its investors abroad but prosecutes domestic 
human rights abuses in accordance with due diligence thus creates a 
double standard. Such territorial limitations on the obligation of states to 
prevent and punish human rights abuses correspond to a rather outdated 
formalistic logic183 that may be incompatible with the nondiscrimination 
principle.184 This is especially true when states maintain such double 
standards with respect to human rights. “Human rights” is an area of in-
ternational law that incorporates objective values that the whole interna-
                                                                                                                                     
 182. The Bhopal Gas Disaster case provides a good example of judicial ineffectiveness 
in protecting human rights. See supra note 8. 
 183. More broadly, particularly in connection with human rights protection, states 
should not “screen behind” a narrow interpretation of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Ac-
cording to the argument that will be set forth below, provided that there is no interference 
with the sovereign rights of the state exercising territorial jurisdiction, jurisdiction shall 
extend beyond the traditional basis of territoriality in such a manner as to allow other 
states to exercise—in the name of the effectiveness in human rights protection—a parallel 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
 184. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, 
OEA/Ser.L.V.II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶ 37 (1999) 
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tional community is committed to safeguarding. Each and every state is 
authorized to react to human rights violations even in cases where the 
state is not directly affected. This section examines two possible legal 
bases for extending the due diligence human rights obligations beyond 
the territorial jurisdictional basis. Such an extension automatically en-
larges the circle of states that may—or, perhaps, must—prevent and pu-
nish human rights violations by the investor. As will be argued, the first 
basis, universal jurisdiction, falls under the discretion of governments 
and, therefore, simply authorizes those governments to exercise jurisdic-
tion, while the second basis, active personality, becomes a pure interna-
tional obligation of the state of origin if seen from the perspective of 
extraterritoriality. 
A. Bases of Jurisdiction 
1. Universal Jurisdiction 
One expression of this state of affairs is the relatively recent tendency, 
demonstrated by a number of states, to apply universal jurisdiction. Uni-
versal jurisdiction is the exercise of jurisdiction by a state, where there is 
no direct link between that state and the wrongful conduct. 
As far as civil jurisdiction is concerned,185 the most widely cited ex-
ample is the United States Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) which pro-
vides that domestic courts have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by 
aliens for torts committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.186 Although this statute, adopted in 1789, had been a 
                                                                                                                                     
 185. For an in-depth analysis of the issue of universal civil jurisdiction, see Donald 
Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Juris-
diction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 142–163 (2006). 
 186. Particularly in the last few years, the ATCA served as the basis for brining cases 
against multinational corporations engaged in human rights violations in the territory of 
the host state (mostly for being complicit with local governments). See, e.g., Abdullahi v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (concerning non-consensual human medical 
experimentation in Nigeria); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (con-
cerning slave labor in Papua New Guinea); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 
1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (concerning breaches of the rights of local population in the Niger 
Delta). On June 8, 2009, a settlement was reached in the case of Wiwa v. Shell, which 
concerned a claim brought under ACTA for the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, one of the lead-
ing activists protesting against human rights breaches and the environmental harm caused 
in the region of the Niger delta by the investment activities of the defendant. Ignacio 
Saiz, Wiwa v. Shell Settlement Just One Small Step Toward Ending Corporate Impunity, 
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, June 10, 2009, 
http://www.cesr.org/article.php?id=363. Ken Saro-Wiwa has been arrested by the au-
thorities of Nigeria, tried by a special tribunal and executed on November 10, 1995. Id. 
The settlement did not require the defendant to assume responsibility for wrong doing. 
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dead letter for more than two hundred years, the U.S. Supreme Court 
recently confirmed its validity in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.187 According 
to the Court, the term “law of nations” refers to the understanding of in-
ternational law in the present day, rather than that at the time of the adop-
tion of the statute.188 Such understanding must “rest on a norm of interna-
tional character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a speci-
ficity comparable to the features of the [eighteenth] century paradigms 
[the Court has] recognized.”189 The Sosa Court held that a brief, arbitrary 
detention does not amount to a breach of international law with the speci-
ficity that customary international law requires, thereby skirting the ju-
risdictional issue presented by the ATCA.190 
Since the ATCA only grants a jurisdictional basis and not a cause of 
action, the cause of action must be established under substantive interna-
tional law.191 Yet, as has rightly been pointed out, the Supreme Court’s 
dicta gives the impression that, for the ATCA to apply, it is not neces-
sary for the norm violated to fall into a specific category, such as jus co-
gens or erga omnes.192 Rather, the Court seems only to require that the 
norm be mature, well-established, and specifically defined in internation-
al law.193 The logical next question concerns whether the ATCA may 
serve as a basis for universal jurisdiction in every case of an individual’s 
violation of international law, regardless of the nature of the norm 
breached.194 
                                                                                                                                     
However, the defendant agreed to pay $15.5 million to the plaintiffs as a “humanitarian 
gesture.” Id. There is little doubt that the choice of the defendant to proceed with such a 
generous and unprecedented “humanitarian gesture” was affected by the district court’s 
decision to recognize the existence of a jurisdictional basis under ATCA for crimes 
against humanity, extra-judicial killing, inhuman treatment, and arbitrary arrest and de-
tention. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 187. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 188. Id. at 725. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 736–737. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Georg Nolte, Universal Jurisdiction in the Area of Private Law – The Alien Tort 
Claims Act, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS 
COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 373, 375–376 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-
Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006). Andrew J. Wilson notes that the term tort in the text of the 
ATCA may be misleading since international law lacks a clear separation between torts 
and crimes. Accordingly, the term may refer either to domestic torts or simply to 
“wrongs” committed in violation of international law. Wilson, supra note 46, at 47. 
 193. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737–38. 
 194. For an overview of the opinions expressed in the literature on this issue, see Do-
novan & Roberts, supra note 185, at 142–45. 
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As mentioned above, obligations erga omnes reflect the idea of the ex-
istence of certain interests or values that are common to the international 
community as a whole rather than being exclusive to individual state. 
Accordingly, an obligation erga omnes is owed towards each and every 
state within the international community. This is why, in the case of 
wrongful conduct that breaches an obligation erga omnes, international 
law recognizes the legitimate interest and competence of states other than 
the one that is directly injured to invoke the international responsibility 
of the perpetrator.195 Given this framework, one can reasonably argue 
that the exercise of universal jurisdiction to prosecute violations of norms 
of lower stature than erga omnes lacks justification in terms of positive 
international law.196 As such, where the norm breached is not erga 
omnes, then a link must be established between the wrongful conduct and 
the legal order of the judicial forum exercising jurisdiction.197 From 
there, it is arguable that universal civil jurisdiction might, in the future, 
prove to be broader than universal criminal jurisdiction.198 While the lat-
ter can only be applied for a fairly small number of heinous international-
ly criminalized human rights abuses, civil universal jurisdiction may ex-
tend well beyond the limited number of international crimes, provided, of 
course, that the violated norms introduce obligations erga omnes. 
However, U.S. judicial practice seems to neglect the erga omnes crite-
rion. “In all ATCA cases decided to date, courts have held that only the 
gravest violations of human rights . . . violate the law of nations.”199 Si-
                                                                                                                                     
 195. ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 48, art. 48(1)(b). This very same 
article could—by analogy of law—be of use also when the author of the violation is an 
individual. 
 196. But see John G. Dale, Transnational Legal Conflict Between Peasants and Cor-
porations in Burma: Human Rights and Discursive Ambivalence Under the US Alien Tort 
Claims Act, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL 
AND THE LOCAL 285, 302 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007) (arguing that 
the term “law of nations” refers to jus cogens norms). 
 197. Genc Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the Law of Nations in the Context of the 
Alien Tort Claim Act and International Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 193, 259 (2005) 
(discussing the personal jurisdiction requirement and the applicable “minimum contacts” 
test). 
 198. But see Wilson, supra note 46, at 57–58 (arguing that the ATCA cannot be seen 
as an exercise of universal jurisdiction). 
 199. Trnavci, supra note 197, at 263–264. See generally Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed 
per stipulation and judgment vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (forced labor, mur-
der, and rape); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (ethnic cleansing); Filartiga 
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture). By contrast, it has been held that the 
breach of the right to peaceful assembly does not fall under the ACTA since it is not yet 
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milarly, the amicus briefs submitted by the European Community in the 
Sosa case suggested that universal civil jurisdiction should be limited to 
cases of “grave” violations of international law.200 The distance separat-
ing the two concepts—”grave” or serious violations of human rights and 
“each and every” erga omnes international norm—is considerable. The 
difference is primarily pragmatic rather than legal. Since universal juris-
diction is permissive rather than obligatory,201 states have considerable 
discretion in exercising it. As a result, it is the national judicial branch, 
which, by deciding cases that are neither directly related to the national 
legal order nor to the state’s exclusive interests, decides whether to act as 
a unilateral guardian of certain universal values. Given that the exercise 
of a wider universal jurisdiction encompassing all violations of erga 
omnes norms would impose a substantial burden on a state’s judiciary, it 
is understandable for national courts to set certain screening criteria202 
even if these criteria are described in extra-legal or axiological terms.203 
It appears, then, that there is a new category of international norms—
something “stronger” than erga omnes but not quite as “strong” as jus 
cogens.204 Despite the fact that this new category has not yet been de-
fined or named, its task is to provide a (still unformed) criterion for faci-
litating a reasonable balance between the need to effectively punish 
                                                                                                                                     
definite enough to meet the standard introduced by Sosa. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 
F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 200. Nolte, supra note 192, at 379. According to the European Community, the exer-
cise of civil universal jurisdiction is not without restrictions. Among other criteria, it is 
argued that the forum must be “better suited.” 
 201. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 185, at 143. This is dependent on whether there 
is an international treaty that establishes an obligation for the state-parties to exercise 
universal jurisdiction. For example, the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture 
requires that states—besides territorial, active, and passive personality jurisdiction—also 
apply universal jurisdiction, in order to prosecute foreign perpetrators of acts of torture 
that have been committed outside their territory. Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 5(2), opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. In a recent decision, 
the ECHR explained that the exercise of universal jurisdiction in such a case is justified 
by the absolute nature (jus cogens) of the prohibition of torture and authorizes states to 
apply their respective domestic criminal legislation. Ould Dah v. France, App. No. 
13113/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng. 
 202. For example, the Sosa Court set a standard for ATCA cases, mainly setting cer-
tain preconditions for the establishment of jurisdiction, in substance, it allows domestic 
courts to relinquish from adjudicating cases which are based on norms of international 
law that are not definite enough. However, in practice only the gravest of human rights 
violations have been found to meet the Sosa standard. 
 203. Such as the typically descriptive notion of “grave” violations, which to date fail to 
correspond to any typology of positive international law norms. 
 204. “Erga omnes plus,” or “jus cogens minus.” 
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heinous human rights abuses and a given state’s capacity to shoulder re-
sponsibilities that do not belong exclusively to it. However, the national 
courts and tribunals are the only competent authorities to engage in such 
balancing.205 
Even if it can be concluded that the ATCA may serve as the basis for 
universal civil jurisdiction in the case of “grave” and, in terms of the So-
sa standard, sufficiently “definite,” violations of erga omnes norms of 
international law, the question remains whether the ATCA grants juris-
diction to causes of action brought by foreign plaintiffs against private 
individuals and entities, including corporations, or only against persons 
or entities exercising public authority. While the existing case law sug-
gests that ATCA jurisdiction is not predicated on the defendant exercis-
ing public authority,206 the picture that emerges is rather fragmented be-
cause there are not very many cases. Unfortunately, as of now, the case 
law creates more questions than it answers. 
For instance, in Kadic v. Karadzic, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit concluded that, while the defendant was only liable for 
certain allegations to the extent that he was a “state actor,” he could also 
be held liable for genocide and war crimes in his private capacity. 207 As 
such, the reach of the “law of nations” is not strictly confined to state 
actors. However, since “torture and summary execution—when not per-
petrated in the course of genocide or war crimes—are proscribed by in-
ternational law only when committed by state officials or under color of 
                                                                                                                                     
 205. This is provided that the legislature intervenes. And even this route may be closed 
off in the United States in the future. See Kevin R. Carter, Note, Amending the Alien Tort 
Claims Act: Protecting Human Rights or Closing Off Corporate Accountability?, 38 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 629, 639 (2006-2007). As Carter explains, there has been strong 
lobbying against universal jurisdiction on the basis of the ATCA. As such, it comes as no 
surprise that initiatives for amending it have already been undertaken. Amicus briefs 
submitted by a number of countries, including Australia, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom, to the U.S. Supreme Court in the Sosa case provide a number of arguments 
against universal civil jurisdiction (including sovereignty, conflict of legal commands, 
legitimacy). Some argue that universal civil jurisdiction should be applied in conformity 
with comity and forum non conveniens. Anne O’Rourke & Chris Nyland, The Recent 
History of the Alien Tort Claims Act: Australia’s Role in its (Attempted) Downfall, 25 
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 139, 139–176 (2006). In connection with that argument, see also 
John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in the U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien 
Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2009) (presenting a 
more pragmatic approach by emphasizing the political and diplomatic burden of ATCA 
for the United States government, as well as the exigencies of the principle of the separa-
tion of powers). 
 206. Kelsy Deye, Can Corporations be Held Liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 
94 KY. L.J. 649, 649–667 (2006) (citing numerous cases). 
 207. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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law,” they are actionable under the ATCA only with regard to “state ac-
tion.”208 If, on the other hand, the wrongs are committed in the course of 
genocide or war crimes, state action is not necessary in order to find lia-
bility, since the wrongs violate norms of international law that “bind[] 
parties to internal conflicts regardless of whether they are recognized 
nations or roving hordes of insurgents.”209 
A similar, but not identical, conclusion was reached by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Doe I v. Unocal Corporation.210 Doe I 
concerned an action brought against an American corporation for forced 
labor imposed on the local population by the army of Myanmar, which 
was responsible for security in the area where the corporation con-
structed a gas pipeline.211 The Court concluded that the alleged violations 
did indeed constitute breaches of international law, as “[t]orture, murder, 
and slavery are jus cogens violations and, thus, violations of the law of 
nations.”212 Furthermore, the Court held that, while “most crimes require 
state action for ATCA liability to attach,” the corporation could be held 
personally liable,213 since “there are a ‘handful of crimes,’ including 
slave trading, ‘to which the law of nations attributes individual liability,’ 
such that state action is not required.”214 Forced labor, being a modern 
variant of slavery, is one of those crimes.215 
The establishment of private liability on the basis of ATCA presuppos-
es that the law of nations attributes such responsibility directly to the in-
dividual in his capacity as an international subject.216 However, whether 
                                                                                                                                     
 208. Id. at 243. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978 
(9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed per stipulation and judgment vacated, 403 F.3d 708 
(9th Cir. 2005). The case eventually settled in 2005 on confidential terms. Doe I v. Unoc-
al Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting the parties’ motion to dismiss the appeals 
and vacating the district court’s opinion). 
 211. Unocal, 395 F.3d, at 936–939. 
 212. Id. at 945. 
 213. Provided that it could be proven that Unocal (the corporation-defendant) aided 
and abetted the army in subjecting the local population to forced labor, so that a connec-
tion to the crime can be established. 
 214. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, 794–795) (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J. concurring)). 
 215. Id. at 946. 
 216. For the types of individual conduct that have been interpreted as covered by 
ATCA, see Jean-François Flauss, Compétence civile universelle et droit international 
général [Universal Civil Jurisdiction and General International Law], in THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 385, 405–06 (Christian To-
muschat & Jean-Marc Thouvelin eds., 2006). For a review of cases that have been 
brought against corporations before U.S. courts on the basis of ATCA, see Lucien J. 
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the concept of civil individual responsibility is to be construed narrowly 
(such that it requires that international law provide for a specific duty of 
the individual), or broadly (such that it comprises all objective interna-
tional norms that impose obligations on the international community as a 
whole) remains at the discretion of the national judge. The pro homine 
advantage of construing individual responsibility broadly is that it will 
cover a breach of each erga omnes norm committed by private actors, 
such as human rights abuses by multinational corporations. In its nar-
rowest possible interpretation, individual responsibility will be limited to 
a small number of internationally wrongful acts that expressly address 
conduct of individuals and that, by their terms, establish a basis for hold-
ing the individual internationally responsible. In that case, the universal 
civil jurisdiction over private individuals and entities will end up being 
parallel to criminal jurisdiction, which, in turn, is limited to only the 
gravest of human rights violations. Indeed, the case law presented here 
reveals a certain U.S. tendency to confer civil jurisdiction on the basis of 
international criminal responsibility of individuals. 
Nonetheless, despite any criticisms of civil universal jurisdiction’s ap-
propriation of tools developed in the framework of international criminal 
law—tools that are foreign to its civil counterpart—one should keep in 
mind that, since universal jurisdiction is traditionally criminal in na-
ture,217 it contains certain elements that can be very useful to civil juris-
diction.218 Furthermore, criminal universal jurisdiction has been devel-
oped in light of the aut dedere aut iudicare principle, which is seen as a 
remedy against the impunity from prosecution for certain gross human 
rights violations considered to be the common responsibility of the whole 
international community. Given the gravity of these violations, the inter-
national community moved in the direction of criminalizing them and 
holding perpetrators personally liable, regardless whether they acted in 
the course of their state functions or as individuals. 
                                                                                                                                     
Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern Transnational Enterprise: Decon-
structing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 3, 25–65 (2003). 
 217. In terms of criminal universal jurisdiction, states unilaterally extend their jurisdic-
tion to prosecute and punish foreigners who commit crimes against foreigners abroad. 
This is true despite the lack of any direct link (principle of territoriality, nationality of 
either the offender or the victim, flag, or protection, related to situations threatening or 
damaging state fundamental interests) between the state asserting jurisdiction and the 
crime. The literature on the question of universal criminal jurisdiction is very rich. See 
LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL 
ASPECTS (2003) (offering a comparative overview of national practices on the topic); 
ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 296 (2008). 
 218. Such as the criminal law “tools” for establishing complicity. 
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As in the case of universal civil jurisdiction, there are several argu-
ments against a state’s unilateral exercise of universal criminal jurisdic-
tion. The point of departure is always the legality of this practice in terms 
of international law and the concern of noninfringement of state sove-
reignty. However, the practice also implicates a number of more specific 
questions, such as the applicability of the maxim ne bis in idem and the 
problem of concurrent jurisdictions,219 as well as the need for coordina-
tion between parallel competencies.220 The picture becomes even more 
blurred if one considers that international law lacks general norms with 
respect to criminal jurisdiction, and, therefore, states enjoy significant 
discretion in setting the criteria according to which they will assume ju-
risdiction.221 Therefore, according to the Permanent Court of Internation-
al Justice (“PCIJ”),222 every state “remains free to adopt the principles 
[that] it regards as best and most suitable,” provided it “does not overstep 
the limits [that] international law places upon its jurisdiction.”223 
The ICJ had the opportunity to examine the legality of universal crimi-
nal jurisdiction in terms of international law and to bring certain criteria 
to the forefront that, if disrespected, would render the exercise of univer-
sal jurisdiction by national courts ultra vires, which would result in states 
being held internationally responsible for wrongful acts carried out by 
their judiciaries. In the Arrest Warrant case,224 the government of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) filed an application before the 
ICJ against Belgium claiming that Belgium’s issuance, pursuant to the 
Belgian Universal Jurisdiction Law,225 of an international arrest warrant 
                                                                                                                                     
 219. Although it is generally accepted that the right of an accused person not to be 
prosecuted twice for the same offense is applicable only within a national context, recent 
tendencies in legal scholarship recognize the existence, under certain conditions, of an 
inter- or transnational effect of the maxim. See Gerard Conway, Ne Bis in Idem in Inter-
national Law, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2003). 
 220. It is generally sustained that universal jurisdiction should be applied only in the 
case that the fora which are territorially or personally linked to the wrong are unwilling 
or unable to bring the perpetrators to justice. Legal scholarship generally tends to criticize 
the so-called “absolute” universal jurisdiction. Under the “conditional” universal jurisdic-
tion, the prosecution of an international crime can only be exercised by a state if the ac-
cused person is on its territory. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
338, 338–39 (2d ed. 2008). 
 221. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19. 
 222. The ICJ is the successor to the PCIJ. 
 223. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 19. 
 224. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 
14). 
 225. Id. at 9 (referencing the Belgian “Law of June 16, 1993 ‘concerning the Punish-
ment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
of Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional’, as amended by the Law of 10 February 
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in absentia against the DRC’s foreign minister, Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi, 
violated international law.226 The Court focused its analysis on the ques-
tion of the extent of the immunity that the DRC minister enjoyed under 
customary international law,227 skillfully avoiding having to take a posi-
tion on the issue of universal jurisdiction.228 
The universal jurisdiction phenomenon reflects the necessity for alter-
native and activist solutions to the drawbacks of international law. While 
the International Criminal Court centralizes and internationalizes the 
fight against impunity, its jurisdiction depends—one way or another—on 
states’ willingness. Consequently, despite the absence of a clear answer 
on its legality and the conditions of its application, universal criminal 
jurisdiction remains in the foreground. At the same time, the effect of 
universal criminal jurisdiction is limited to a small number of crimes—
those considered of universal concern. As such, a minimum level of 
gravity is required for universal criminal liability. Although it is possible 
that investor conduct could rise to such a level, if universal jurisdiction 
were to be the sole basis for punishing human rights abuses by corpora-
tions, a large number of everyday offenses would go unpunished. 
2. Active Personality Jurisdiction 
State practice, as reflected in national criminal law, provides an alter-
native to the universal basis of jurisdiction that may prove to be of great 
utility in punishing the illegal conduct of investors abroad. Under the 
active personality (or “active nationality”) basis of criminal jurisdiction, 
states are competent to prosecute their nationals (and in some legal or-
ders, persons domiciled in their territory), without regard to the place 
where an offense was committed.229 While an indirect link—based on the 
                                                                                                                                     
1999 ‘concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law’”). 
 226. Id. at 9–10. The Belgian arrest warrant charged Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi with grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity. Id. at 9. 
 227. Id. at 19–22. 
 228. However, the ICJ may take the opportunity to address this question in a case cur-
rently pending before it. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=129. It should be noted 
that in a separate opinion, the former president of the ICJ, Judge Guillaume, concluded 
that universal jurisdiction exists against piracy. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 37–38 
(separate opinion of Judge Guillaume). Also, in a separate opinion, Judge Koroma added 
genocide and slave trade to the list of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction. Id. at 61–62 
(separate opinion of Judge Koroma). 
 229. In terms of the narrower version of the active personality principle, the exercise of 
jurisdiction hinges on the condition that the conduct also be illegal within the legal order 
of the locus delicti, the place where the offense is committed. 
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concept of obligations erga omnes—between the forum and the wrongful 
act suffices to establish universal jurisdiction, the link between the 
wrongful conduct and the forum has to be more tangible and direct to 
establish “active personality” jurisdiction. Active personality stems from 
the notion that states have both a responsibility and a legitimate interest 
in preventing and punishing offenses committed by their own nationals, 
who remain their subjects even when they are abroad. In light of the fight 
against impunity, active personality jurisdiction can be seen as a sort of 
counter-balance to state policy of refusal to extradite nationals. 
Obviously, the application of the active personality basis for punishing 
human rights abuses committed abroad by the investor raises a number 
of technical problems.230 First and foremost, as argued above, the com-
plicated corporate structure of multinational firms makes the determina-
tion of their nationality difficult.231 Second, where the domestic legal 
order confines prosecution to natural persons, the attribution of criminal 
responsibility to the people participating in corporate decision-making 
proves to be a rather thorny issue. Nonetheless, since active personality 
is a unilateral basis for the exercise of jurisdiction that, in substance, as-
sociates an illegal act with the legal order of the forum exercising juris-
diction, it vests that very same legal order with the authority to solve 
these issues. 
Like universal jurisdiction, active personality jurisdiction is the prod-
uct of state practice. Both these principles reflect the idea that states en-
joy discretion in unilaterally establishing the jurisdictional bases within 
their domestic legal systems.232 Nonetheless, this Article argues that, un-
                                                                                                                                     
 230. Olivier de Schutter, L’incrimination Universelle de la Violation des Droits So-
ciaux Fondamentaux [Universal Criminalization of the Violation of Fundamental Social 
Rights], 64 ANNALES DE DROIT DE LOUVAIN 209, 209–245 (2004). Olivier de Schutter 
examines this issue in regard to the legislation adopted by Belgium for the “universal 
incrimination” of the violation of fundamental social rights. After proving that, in reality, 
the legislation does not confer the judiciary with universal jurisdiction but an active per-
sonality jurisdiction, De Schutter discusses its compatibility with international law and 
analyzes certain problems related to its application against moral persons. 
 231. See supra Part I.B. 
 232. Even scholars who are skeptical of the idea of universal jurisdiction in terms of its 
compatibility with international law tend to recognize that active personality is allowed. 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 36–37 (Feb. 
14) (separate opinion of Judge Guillaume). Judge Van den Wyngaert, in a dissenting 
opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, drew a broader theoretical framework. According to 
Judge Van den Wyngaert, a distinction should be made between prescriptive jurisdiction 
and enforcement jurisdiction. Id. at 167–68 (separate opinion of Judge Van den Wyn-
gaert). As such, despite its extraterritorial effects, the active personality jurisdictional 
basis is permitted for states, as long as it does not lead to material acts of extraterritorial 
enforcement. Id. 
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like universal jurisdiction, which does not introduce an obligation on 
states to apply it, active personality represents one of the means by which 
states can comply with their due diligence obligations. When viewed on-
ly from the due diligence standpoint, a state of origin’s use of active per-
sonality jurisdiction to prosecute human rights abuses committed by in-
vestors in the host state is not discretionary,233 but rather constitutes an 
international obligation. The only condition for the validity of this argu-
ment is that states’ human rights obligations extend beyond their territo-
ry. 
B. The Question of Extraterritoriality Revisited: Beyond the Criterion of 
Effectiveness in the Exercised Control 
Although a considerable amount of international case law has been 
produced in recent years on the issue of extraterritoriality in the protec-
tion of human rights,234 the specific proposal examined in this Article has 
never been subject to judicial analysis. However, as always, the lack of a 
judicially validated answer leaves the door wide open for unbridled de-
bate among scholars. This section will review the ways in which the ex-
isting case law, while not quite on point, is often relevant nonetheless, 
and offers, at the very least, significant probative insight. The cases to be 
discussed are divided into two broad categories.235 The first group of cas-
es, while focusing on obligations arising from conduct directly attributa-
ble to states, is included to demonstrate that, regardless of the highly 
problematic nature of the basis that has been used, the metaphorical um-
                                                                                                                                     
 233. John Ruggie, the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises noted in his 2008 
report that while  
experts disagree on whether international law requires home States to help pre-
vent human rights abuses abroad by corporations based within their territory, 
there is greater consensus that those States are not prohibited from doing so 
where a recognized basis of jurisdiction exists and the actions of the home State 
meet an overall reasonableness test, which includes non-intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of other States. 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnactional Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 19, delivered to the General Assumbly, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
 234. For a comprehensive overview of the extraterritorial effect of human rights, see 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHT TREATIES (Fons Coomans & Menno 
T. Kamminga eds., 2004). 
 235. For a different classification, as well as for an overview of the existing case law, 
see Virginia Mantouvalou, Extending Judicial Control in International Law: Human 
Rights Treaties and Extraterritoriality, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 147, 147–163 (2005). 
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bilical cord of territoriality has been categorically cut. The second group 
of cases is more relevant to this Article’s specific discussion of the obli-
gations of a state to exercise vigilance with respect to extraterritorial hu-
man rights abuses. 
1. Extraterritorial Obligations and Direct Attribution 
The first category of cases corresponds to situations where, although 
the wrongful conduct was committed outside the territory of a state, it is 
directly attributable to that state. As it often happens, regional judicial 
regimes—especially those of the ECHR—were at the forefront of this 
evolution.236 Still, despite the ECHR’s contribution to the general context 
of extraterritoriality, this section argues that that Court’s role is not with-
out any side effects, and that there is a strong risk of “embedding” the 
function of the universal protection of human rights with characteristics 
that are inherent only to the regional level of protection. 
So far, the ECHR has extended the reach of the European Convention 
beyond state territory for wrongful conduct directly attributable to a state 
in two types of cases: (1) where state-agents committed human rights 
abuses abroad,237 and (2) where a de facto control was exercised over the 
territory of another state.238 According to the ECHR, the conditio sine 
qua non for such an extraterritorial effect of the European Convention 
provisions is that the control exercised by state authorities is “effec-
                                                                                                                                     
 236. See, e.g., Michael Gondek, Extraterritorial Application of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights: Territorial Focus in the Age of Globalization?, 52 NETH. INT’L L. 
REV. 349, 349–387 (2005); Aysegul Uzun, Extraterritorial Application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: An Overview of the Strasbourg Case-Law, in THE RULE OF 
LAW IN PEACE OPERATIONS 451, 451–472 (Int’l Soc’y for Military Law and the Law of 
War ed., Report of 17th International Congress, 2006). 
 237. See, e.g., Öcalan v. Turk., App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/2005/May/GrandChamberjudgmentOcalanvTurkey120
505.htm. There, the ECHR held that the alleged violations fell under the jurisdiction of 
the respondent state, since the applicant, who was arrested by Turkish officials in the 
territory of a third country “was subject to their authority and control” and, therefore, 
under “effective Turkish authority” (effective control over persons). Id. ¶ 93; see also 
Issa v. Turk., App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 71 (2004), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/Nov/ChamberjudgmentIssaandOthersvTurkey16
1104.htm (giving an extensive list of relative case law of other international human rights 
fora); Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, 
OEA/Ser.L.V.II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶ 37 (1999). 
 238. See Loizidou v. Turk., 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23–24 (Judgment on Prelimi-
nary Objections) (1995); Loizidou v. Turk., 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2234–35 
(Judgment on the Merits); Ilaşcu v. Mold. and Russ., 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 263. 
220 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
tive,”239 even if it is exercised temporarily.240 The failure to prove that the 
state—accused of breaching human rights outside its territory—exercised 
an effective control over the violative conduct excludes the applicability 
of the European Convention regardless of whether the conduct could, in 
terms of the law on state responsibility, be attributable to that state.241 
That is to say that, under the European Convention regime, the attribu-
tion to a state of a wrongful act committed outside its territory, does not 
automatically authorize the ECHR to exercise jurisdiction. Next to the 
preliminary question of the attribution of the wrongfulness, the ECHR 
case law has raised a second, artificial criterion—namely, the effective-
ness in the exercised control. 
However, the activist choice of the ECHR in the Loizidou case242 to si-
lently “isolate” the criterion of effective control from the norms regard-
ing the attribution of internationally wrongful acts—done in order to di-
rectly transpose it as an artificial condition for the limitation of the extra-
territorial effect of the European Convention243 (and, consequently, of its 
own judicial competence)—is rather unfortunate. Although, admittedly, 
the ECHR case law succeeded in effectively cutting the cord of territo-
riality in human rights protection, the criterion of effectively exercised 
control appears—in terms of positive law—to be a rather problematic 
                                                                                                                                     
 239. Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23–24; Loizidou, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2234–35; 
Ilaşcu, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 263. 
 240. Issa v. Turk., App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74 (2004), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/Nov/ChamberjudgmentIssaandOthersvTurkey16
1104.htm. 
 241. In a controversial decision of the ECHR on admissibility in Banković v. Belgium, 
the court held that, under the terms of the European Convention, the breaches of human 
rights in the territory of a third country fall under the jurisdiction of the state who perpe-
trated it only if that state has effective control over the territory. Banković v. Belgium, 
2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 356–59; see also Hussein v. Albania, App. No. 23276/04, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2006), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2006/March/HUSSEIN%20 
ADMISSIBILITY%20DECISION.htm (declaring the case inadmissible because the ap-
plicant “has not demonstrated that [the respondent states] had jurisdiction on the basis of 
their control of the territory where the alleged violations took place.”). 
 242. Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31. Although the reasoning of the ECHR lacks the 
clarity that one would expect from a judicial forum of its standing, the Court jointly ans-
wered in the affirmative the questions of both the attribution of the conduct to the res-
pondent state and the extraterritorial jurisdiction of that state (and consequently of the 
Court itself). 
 243. Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 47–82. 
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construction that threatens to negatively affect the broader regime of hu-
man rights protection at the universal level.244 
In terms of positive international law, the rules governing attribution 
are secondary state obligations that refer to state responsibility. By con-
trast, the concept of jurisdiction—both territorial and extraterritorial—
stems from the framework of primary state obligations and serves as the 
basis for delimiting the sphere of competence. That being explained, it 
becomes clear that the questions of attribution and extraterritoriality are 
regulated by different bodies of law and should therefore have been 
treated by the ECHR separately.245 Since the premises and the raison 
                                                                                                                                     
 244. See, e.g., General Comment No. 31, supra note 96, ¶ 10 (requiring that states 
“respect and ensure the rights laid down in the [ICCPR] to anyone within [their] power or 
effective control . . . even if not situated within [their] territory”). 
 245. Without necessarily affecting the correctness of the conclusions drawn, the ten-
dency to confuse attribution with extraterritoriality is present also in the case law that the 
ICJ produced after the relevant ECHR case law. For instance, in the Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo case, the ICJ concluded that “Uganda’s responsibility is en-
gaged both for any acts of its military that violated its international obligations and for 
any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanita-
rian law by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on 
their own account,” but only after the Court was satisfied that the respondent state exer-
cised—as an occupying power—effective control over a part of the territory of the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda), at 60 (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/116/10455.pdf. In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construc-
tion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ opted for a broader ap-
proach. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf. There, the ICJ simply stated that  
while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be ex-
ercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem natural that, 
even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be bound to 
comply with its provisions. 
Id. ¶ 109. However, although the ICJ seems reluctant in the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory opinion to rely on the crite-
rion of effective control, presumably, the control that an occupying power exercises is 
ipso facto an effective one. See id. Lastly, in its recent Order on Provisional Measures in 
the Georgia v. Russia case, the ICJ took an equally broad view with regard to the terri-
torial reach of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ. Fed.) (Req. for the indication of Provisional Meas-
ures) (Order of Oct. 15, 2008), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/140/14801.pdf. There, the ICJ observed:  
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d’être of the two legal bases are divergent, attribution cannot serve as the 
basis for extraterritoriality or be treated as a pretext for jumping into un-
justified conclusions about the limits of judicial competence. However, 
in assessing ECHR’s practice, one has to recognize that the European 
Convention is in fact a treaty “operating in an essentially regional con-
text” and is “not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in 
respect of the conduct of the State Parties to it.”246 In other words, the 
criterion of the effectiveness in the exercised control is akin to an artifi-
cial tool that has been maladroitly developed by a regional court when 
that court felt the necessity to somehow delimitate its competence in a 
way that would enable it to maintain its regional nature and avoid ending 
up a de facto quasi-global court.247 
However, these constraints are inherent only to regional systems of 
protection. They are absent in cases of customary human rights norms 
and the so-called UN human rights system, which are by definition uni-
versal. In light of this, it is arguable that at the universal level, extraterri-
toriality should not be limited by the criterion of effectiveness in the con-
trol exercised over a situation. As such, states should simply be prohi-
bited from acting outside their territory—either through their organs or 
                                                                                                                                     
Whereas the Parties [to the conflict] disagree on the territorial scope of the ap-
plication of the obligations of a State party under CERD . . . [the] provisions of 
CERD generally appear to apply, like other provisions of instruments of that 
nature, to the actions of a State party when it acts beyond its territory. 
Id. ¶ 108–09. However, the general extraterritorial effect of the CERD does not appear to 
be the result of an explicit rejection by the ICJ of the criterion of effectiveness in the 
exercised control. Quite the contrary, the Court chose to justify its interpretation on the 
wording of the CERD in that “there is no restriction of a general nature in CERD relating 
to its territorial application . . . [and], in particular, neither Article 2 nor Article 5 of 
CERD, alleged violations of which are invoked by Georgia, contain a specific territorial 
limitation.” Id. at 109. 
 246. Christos Rozakis, The Territorial Scope of Human Rights Obligations: The Case 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, in THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL 
TREATIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 55, 63 (Venice Commission ed., 2006). As the ECHR points 
out, other international instruments designed for the protection of human rights expressly 
recognize a broader semantic field to the term “jurisdiction.” Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 357–58. 
 247. This delimitation arguably circumvented the effect of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Of course, other objectives do exist as well. For example, the criterion 
of the effectiveness in the exercised control was used by the ECHR to allow the Court 
“escape” from exercising jurisdiction on the merits of certain highly politicized cases, 
such as the NATO military intervention over Kosovo and the occupation of Iraq by the 
United Kingdom. See Hussein v. Albania, App. No. 23276/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2006/March/HUSSEIN%20ADMISSIBILITY 
%20DECISION.htm; Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
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through third subjects whose conduct is attributable to them—in a way 
that they are not allowed to behave on their own.248 In this case, extrater-
ritoriality and direct attribution do in fact converge. 
2. Extraterritorial Obligations under Due Diligence 
Within the second general category of extraterritorial effect of human 
rights norms, the question is whether the sphere of jurisdiction should be 
limited only to those actions or omissions that are “directly” attributable 
to the state. Interestingly, the ECHR provided an answer to this question 
even before crystallizing its effective control criterion as a condition for 
the extraterritorial enlargement of jurisdiction over conduct attributable 
to one of the parties to the European Convention. 
In the Soering case, the United States asked that the United Kingdom 
extradite a German national who committed a crime on U.S. territory.249 
Noting that the accused would be kept on death row for a prolonged pe-
riod of time if the United Kingdom proceeded with the extradition, the 
Court concluded that the respondent state (the United Kingdom) would 
be found in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention, which pro-
hibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.250 According to the 
Court’s opinion, the requirement set forth in the very first article of the 
European Convention—to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms” protected by the European Convention—cannot 
be read as creating an obligation for states to impose the Convention 
standards on third states.251 Nonetheless, the European Convention does 
develop an extraterritorial effect in the sense that, even if “the United 
Kingdom has no power over the practices and arrangements of the Vir-
ginia authorities which are the subject of the applicant’s complaints . . . 
[t]hese considerations cannot . . . absolve the Contracting Parties from 
responsibility under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable consequences of 
extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction.”252 
In other words, in cases of extradition, the respondent state can in fact 
be found internationally responsible for conduct that was neither com-
mitted by its own agents nor took place on its territory. The semantic 
field of prohibition of torture develops extraterritorial effect to guarantee 
                                                                                                                                     
 248. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, ¶ 12(3), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979  (July 29, 1981), available at http://www.unhcr.org/; see also 
Issa, supra note 237, ¶ 71. 
 249. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1989). 
 250. Id. at 44–45. 
 251. Id. at 33–34.  
 252. Id. at 34. 
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that there will be no risk of individuals suffering a violation.253 The state 
exercising (effective) jurisdiction over a subject is obligated to adopt the 
available necessary measures to prevent a foreseeable violation. The pre-
ventive extraterritorial effect of the obligation is justified in terms of the 
effectiveness required by the European Convention in the protection of 
an absolute human right that does not allow for derogations (i.e., jus co-
gens) and that will amount to an irreparable violation.254 Finally, it 
should be noted that the jus cogens nature of the protective norm is not a 
condition for the extraterritorial effect of the due diligence obligations in 
the field of human rights. The ECHR recognized the same effect with 
respect to the right to life “in circumstances in which the expelling state 
knowingly puts the person concerned at such a high risk of losing his life 
that the outcome is a near-certainty.”255 Since both the right to life and 
the prohibition of torture are closely linked to human physical integrity, 
one could argue that the Court tends to limit the extraterritorial effect of 
due diligence only to the most “serious” human rights violations. How-
ever, once the criterion of jus cogens is eliminated, the road is open for 
the case law—in the name of effet utile—to enlarge the circle of rights. 
In the H.L.R. judgment regarding deportation, the ECHR recognized an 
indirect horizontal effect to the extraterritorial dimension of due dili-
gence for the safeguarding of Article 3 of the European Convention. 256 
“Owing to the absolute character” of Article 3, the ECHR found that the 
right is to be protected from the risk of a foreseeable violation abroad 
even if “the danger emanates from persons . . . who are not public offi-
cials.”257 Nonetheless, the right’s extraterritorial dimension is limited by 
the fact that “[i]t must be shown that . . . the authorities of the receiving 
                                                                                                                                     
 253. See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/homepage_en. There, the Court had the opportunity to 
reassert the absolute prohibition of extradition in a situation where the respondent state 
was suspicious that the applicant was involved in international terrorism. Holding that a 
“real risk” for the right of the applicant existed despite the relevant diplomatic assurances 
provided by the authorities of the receiving state, the ECHR noted that since “the prohibi-
tion of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute, irrespec-
tive of the victim’s conduct, the nature of the offence allegedly committed by the appli-
cant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3.” Id. ¶ 127 (internal citation omit-
ted). 
 254. Id. ¶ 87–90. 
 255. See Dougoz v. Greece, App. No. 40907/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 8, 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/homepage_en (case law cited therein); see also 
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 470/1991: Kindler v. Canada, ¶ 6(2), 13(1), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (Nov. 11, 1993). 
 256. H.L.R. v. France, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 745. 
 257. Id. at 758. 
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state are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protec-
tion.”258 Accordingly, the respective obligations to prevent the violation 
of human rights through affirmative conduct of the territorial state and 
the state exercising effective control are autonomous and parallel to each 
other with the latter state’s obligation being subsidiary in nature and only 
activated where the territorial state is unable or unwilling to provide ef-
fective protection. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the case law puts emphatic empha-
sis on effectiveness of exercised control, even though it is a rather artifi-
cial tool geared toward the need for regional systems to be able to main-
tain their regional nature and avoid the burden of exercising jurisdiction 
over each and every international human rights violation. However, the 
ECHR provided a contradictory example in the Ilaşcu case where the 
Court seemed to imply that the effective control test does not apply at all 
in the case of extraterritorial due diligence/affirmative obligations.259 
There, the applicants claimed illegal detention by the “Moldavian Repub-
lic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”), an entity that proclaimed independence 
in 1991.260 There were two respondent states—Russia, which was exer-
cising effective control over “MRT” and, therefore, de facto jurisdiction, 
and Moldova, which was exercising no control at all over that part of its 
territory. In light of the fact that the conduct of the de facto entity was 
directly attributable to Russia, it was natural that Russia was deemed re-
sponsible. However, the Court reached a surprising conclusion: 
[E]ven in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian re-
gion, Moldova still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the 
Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other meas-
ures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with interna-
tional law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Con-
vention.261 
The condemnation of Moldova by the Court was justified on the basis 
of the country’s failure to adopt positive measures for the safeguarding 
of the applicants’ rights, which continued to fall under Moldova’s juris-
diction despite the lack of any type of effective control, either over the 
territory (de facto extraterritoriality) or over the persons (victimizers and 
victims alike).262 As the Vice President of the ECHR, Judge Rozakis, 
noted: 
                                                                                                                                     
 258. Id. 
 259. Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179. 
 260. Id. at 199. 
 261. Id. at 266. 
 262. Id. at 267–72. 
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[T]he Court in the case of Ilaşcu took a different approach by incorpo-
rating the issue of positive obligations within the very notion of juris-
diction and by disregarding the test of effective control as a pre-
condition for the establishment of jurisdiction. . . . It clearly transpires 
from the Ilaşcu judgment that the Court has developed a rather subjec-
tive test in determining whether Moldova faced up to its positive obli-
gations, by calling into question its political tactics in effectively pro-
tecting the human rights of the individual applicants. . . . 263 
Arguably, then, the extraterritorial effect of due diligence in the protec-
tion of human rights does not rely on the condition of effective control. 
However, this is not meant to imply that effectiveness is deprived of any 
practical significance. Due diligence, being an obligation of means, relies 
upon the condition that the state dispose of the necessary means to 
preempt wrongfulness. Obviously, the wider the extent of control that a 
state exercises over a given situation, the more the state is capable of gu-
aranteeing the effectiveness of the affirmative conduct. In other words, 
expectations of effectively demonstrated diligence should be proportio-
nate to the effectiveness of control the state exercises over a given situa-
tion. However, even in the case of absolute absence of control, provided 
that the state is linked to the situation, the state’s authorities are expected 
to demonstrate an effort to prevent wrongfulness by any means available 
(even purely political). The sole condition for a state to bear an obligation 
to demonstrate diligent protection of human rights beyond its national ter-
ritory is simply that the state be somehow linked with the situation.264 
Clearly, the more tangible the link between the state and the specific situa-
tion, the stronger the obligation that the state to adopt affirmative conduct. 
As previously noted, universal jurisdiction entails an indirect, norma-
tive link between wrongfulness and domestic courts, namely the erga 
omnes quality of the breached norm. In that scenario, the state enjoys 
absolute discretion. Where the state is not directly linked with the wrong-
fulness of the investor, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction remains 
optional. However, given the broad extraterritorial effect developed un-
der the due diligence principle, a home state that is directly linked—
through the bonds of nationality—to human rights violations committed 
by its own citizen-investors abroad is expected to exercise jurisdiction on 
                                                                                                                                     
 263. Rozakis, supra note 246, at 70. 
 264. But see Carsten Hoppe, Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Mili-
tary Companies, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 989, 994, 1012–1013 (2008) (examining this question 
in light of the responsibility of the state for the illicit activities of the private military 
companies hired by it and suggesting that the condition of effective control for the exer-
cise of extraterritorial jurisdiction applies as well in the case of the due diligence-
stemming positive obligations of the state). 
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the basis of active personality. In that case, the exercise of active perso-
nality jurisdiction ceases to be a “privilege” for the home state and be-
comes an international obligation.265 
Finally, while the case law presented in this Article leaves no room for 
doubts concerning the conditioned extraterritorial effect of the due dili-
gence obligations in the field of human rights, a potential objection is 
that, in these cases, states are in fact exercising effective control over the 
victim of the violation and not over the victimizer. Arguably, then, if the 
analogy must be a perfect one, the existent case law is inadequate to con-
clude, in positive terms, that the state of origin is obliged to undertake 
the prevention and punishment of the violations of human rights perpe-
trated abroad by its investors. 
In countering this objection one could argue, as the Ilaşcu judgment 
indicates, that there is nothing to suggest that the application of the extra-
territorial effect of due diligence should be restricted only to control ex-
ercised over victims. On the contrary, there are numerous good rea-
                                                                                                                                     
 265. One of the questions examined by the ICJ in the Genocide Case was the alleged 
responsibility of Serbia for failing to prevent and punish—on the basis of the Convention 
for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—the genocide against Bos-
nian Muslims in Srebrenica. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pu-
nishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide case) (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) 
(Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), ¶ 425, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007). The massacre was 
committed by Serbian nationals acting outside the territory of Serbia and was not attri-
butable to it. The Court made clear that the duty to prevent corresponds to an obligation 
of conduct and decided to distinguish the two aspects of due diligence, namely prevention 
and punishment, and to consider them separately. Id. ¶ 425–30. With respect to the obli-
gation to punish, the Court noted that, given that the genocide has not been carried out in 
the territory of Serbia, Serbian tribunals were—under the Genocide Convention—
allowed to punish it, but not obliged to do so. Id. ¶ 442. Moreover, the ICJ concluded that 
Serbia had an obligation to cooperate with the ICTY. Id. ¶ 443. The prima facie impres-
sion given by ICJ’s decision is that it refuses to recognize the extraterritorial effect of the 
duty to punish. However, a more careful reading of the judgment reveals that the Court 
wished to remain “faithful” to the text of the Genocide Convention, which was its sole 
focus. As the Court made clear from the very beginning of its analysis on the duty to 
protect, the content of that duty varies from one instrument to another. Therefore, making 
a more general statement on the duty to protect is not within the Court’s scope. Id. ¶ 429. 
Hence, the margin of appreciation that it recognizes to the respondent state concerning 
the punishment of genocide at domestic level stems exclusively from Article VI of the 
Genocide Convention, which is also establishing an obligation for it to co-operate with 
ICTY. Id. ¶¶ 442–43. The aim of the Court is clearly not to depart from the regime of the 
“Genocide Convention” and to put the accent to the obligation for Serbia to co-operate 
with ICTY. Given these remarks, the Genocide Case cannot serve as a source for drawing 
more general conclusions on the nature of the extraterritorial effect of the duty to punish 
on the basis of active personality. 
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sons—hinged on international reality, as well as the normative structures 
of international law—for why the extraterritorial effect of the due dili-
gence obligations of the state of origin should cover human rights abuses 
committed by investors abroad. First, the international reality today is 
such that, while host states are often not in a position to effectively pro-
tect the local population from the wrongful conduct of investors, interna-
tional law remains quasi-silent at best, as to the international responsibil-
ity of investors. This creates a clear necessity to fight impunity in the 
field of international investments, and states should be expected to make 
a positive contribution toward that goal. Additionally, at the normative 
level, the raison d’être of the international law of human rights is to pro-
vide effective protection. Therefore, in terms of positive international 
law, states have the duty to fight human rights abuses through diligent 
conduct to the best of their capacities. After territoriality, nationality of-
fers the second most pragmatic, substantive, tangible, and material basis 
allowing for the extension of jurisdiction beyond territory in order for 
states to effectively protect “legitimate community interest[s]”—
obligations erga omnes—of the global community.266 
That being said, it comes as no surprise that the CESCR included, in its 
Comment on the right to water, a clear obligation for states “to prevent 
their own citizens and companies from violating the right to water of in-
dividuals and communities in other countries.”267 According to the line 
                                                                                                                                     
 266. General Comment No. 31, supra note 96, at ¶ 2. 
 267. General Comment No. 15, supra note 147, at ¶ 33. The ICESCR, in contrast to 
the majority of other human right instruments, remains silent as to its jurisdictional 
sphere of application. Instead of defining it in terms of territory or jurisdiction, it only 
mentions, in Article 2(1), that all states must take steps, individually and through interna-
tional assistance and cooperation to achieve the full realization of the rights enlisted in it. 
ICESCR, supra note 118, art. 2(1). By emphasizing the concept of progressive realiza-
tion, Matthew Craven suggests that a “territorial conception of economic, social and cul-
tural rights . . . puts into question the very rationale of ESC rights.” Matthew Craven, The 
Violence of Dispossession: Extra-Territoriality and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION 71, 78 (Mashood A. 
Baderin & Robert McCorquodale eds., 2007). Fons Coomans suggests that, given the 
nature of social rights, there is no need for an immediate and direct link with the wrong-
ful conduct of the state as the extraterritorial application of social rights “often relates to 
general situations of deprivation that cannot always be qualified in terms of violations of 
[social] rights of specific individual victims.” Fons Coomans, Some Remarks on the 
Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHT TREATIES 183, 186 
(Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004). Therefore, according to Coomans, 
extraterritoriality “cannot be qualified as the exercise of effective authority and control 
over persons, although persons in another country may be affected by a decision taken in 
a (donor) country.” Id. 
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of reasoning presented in this Article, such prevention cannot extend 
beyond the means available to a state.268 However, no matter how limited 
those means, it is difficult to imagine a set of circumstances that could 
keep states from—on the basis of the active personality principle—
prosecuting their citizen-investors who, for instance, pollute the water 
resources in a third country, or from adopting domestic legislation269 that 
prohibits such behavior regardless of where it takes place.270 
CONCLUSION 
Early on in this Article, it was suggested that the classic state-centric 
vision of international law can and should offer certain alternative solu-
tions to the asymmetries that its legal order contains with regard to the 
disequilibrium in the attributes of the international legal personality of 
multinational corporations. The effective implementation by states of 
their due diligence obligations in the field of human rights protection, 
apart from protecting the victims of human rights abuses, will also be of 
                                                                                                                                     
 268. Although that legislation also cannot disproportionately violate rights of the investor. 
 269. See Institut de Droit Int’l, supra note 46, ¶ 6(a).  
A State may impose reasonable regulations on a multinational enterprise whose 
parent company is established in that State with regard to the activity of its sub-
sidiaries established in other States . . . . In applying such regulations a State 
should seek to avoid conflict with the law or regulations of the States in which 
the subsidiaries are established or the activities take place. 
At the international level, there is nothing to prohibit states from including human rights 
provisions in their BITs. For example, the draft model of BIT proposed by Norway which 
provides for the encouragement of “investors to conduct their investment activities in 
compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to participate in 
the United Nations Global Compact.” Draft Model Norwegian Bilateral Investment Trea-
ty art. 32, Dec. 19, 2007, available at http://www.asil.org/. However, one has to admit 
that the complex corporate structures of multinational corporations with the attendant 
overlap between multiple domestic legal orders and the difficulties in the determination 
of their nationality, render it more difficult to define the state which is entitled (or, ac-
cording to the argument advanced by this Article, even obliged) to exercise control over a 
company and regulate its activities. Furthermore, as noted by Steven Ratner,  
[m]any of the largest TNEs have headquarters in one state, shareholders in oth-
ers, and operations worldwide. If the host state fails to regulate the acts of the 
company, other states, including the state of the corporation’s nationality, may 
well choose to abstain from regulation based on the extraterritorial nature of the 
acts at issue. 
Ratner, supra note 5, at 463. In accordance with this argument, the role of the home state 
cannot be but complementary to that of the host state. 
 270. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in 
Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 292–293 (2009). 
230 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
substantive aid in the process of crystallization of the corpus juris regu-
lating both the primary and secondary obligations of investors in the field 
of human rights. However, even after the framework of the international 
obligations of corporations reaches a level of normative and practical 
maturity, the state’s role will continue to be central in its effective im-
plementation. 
This Article suggests that until the international legal order reaches that 
point of maturity, the existing lacunae may be filled by emphasizing the 
affirmative obligations that states have under the due diligence principle. 
Although priority is given to the state exercising territorial authority, 
states that are directly linked to a given situation (through nationality, for 
instance) are equally obligated to make a positive contribution to preven-
tion and sanctioning of an international wrong. In fact, the latter state’s 
international obligations to demonstrate diligence are parallel and com-
plementary to those of the state exercising territorial jurisdiction. The 
criterion here is the equilibrium that must be maintained between state 
sovereignty and effectiveness in human rights protection. Accordingly, 
where the host state (possessing the territorial link) is found to be in a 
situation of impossibility or unwillingness to adopt the necessary positive 
measures, it is for the state of origin (which possesses the nationality 
link) to exercise subsidiary diligence through the punishment of the hu-
man rights abuses of its investors. With respect to prevention, there is 
nothing that prevents both the home state and the host state from advanc-
ing parallel policies. 
The need for such a pro-active approach is self-evident in light of to-
day’s international reality, in which powerful corporations develop their 
activities within the territory of less puissant states. In this game, the 
state of origin is far from neutral and the puzzle is further complicated by 
the quasi-silence of international law as to human rights obligations and 
the responsibility of corporations. 
The “construction” proposed in this Article regarding the international 
obligations of the state of origin was developed on three levels. First, we 
must accept that states have a generic obligation to demonstrate dili-
gence. Second, for the standard of diligence to take on a concrete shape, 
it must be “embodied” within the substantive international human rights 
obligations of states. And, finally, these human rights obligations must 
develop an extraterritorial effect on the basis of a nexus connecting one 
state’s legal order with specific wrongful conduct. The cumulative con-
fluence of these three conditions makes it not just possible but, in fact, 
obligatory for the state of origin to regulate and control the international 
activities of its investors. Accordingly, states enjoy discretion in punish-
ing investors’ human rights breaches on the basis of universal jurisdic-
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tion, while the “home” state bears a positive international obligation via 
active personality jurisdiction to both regulate and punish its own inves-
tors who abuse human rights abroad. Any failure to do so results in inter-
national responsibility on the part of that state. 
Nonetheless, this construct of obligations does have specific limita-
tions that stem from each level of the proposed structure and interact cu-
mulatively. For one, due diligence only introduces an obligation of 
means. Moreover, leaving aside the handful of human rights norms that 
enjoy the jus cogens normative supremacy, the rest of the nonabsolute 
fundamental rights are susceptible to legitimate limitations. Additionally, 
proportionality is the instrument that enables the maintenance of a fair 
balance between the protection of dignity-stemming values of humanity 
on the one hand, and the libertarian margin of discretion for governments 
to regulate their markets and decide on priorities with regard to invest-
ment or, more broadly, to economic policy, on the other hand. 
